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While much philosophical attention has been devoted to discussing 
realism in the physical sciences, i.e. scientific realism, very little work has 
been done with regard to articulating and examining realism in the social 
sciences, i.e. what I term social scientific realism. This thesis constitutes an 
attempt at this and will consider social scientific realism by first providing a 
comprehensive definition of the view—doing so vis-à-vis scientific realism. It 
will be argued that what sets realism in the social sciences apart from that in 
the physical sciences is the heavy use of the notion of emergence and 
consequently the notion of emergence is explored—pointing out that despite 
the myriad accounts of emergence available the one that best suits social 
scientific realism is General Ontological Supervenience Emergence. Finally, 
attention is given to the type of objects studied in the social sciences—it is 
argued that such objects are best thought of as interactive kinds and that it is 








The issue of realism in the philosophy of science is an important one. 
Scientific realism, at its most general, is the view that the picture of the world 
painted by science is correct—scientific descriptions of the world are true of 
the actual world out there. Philosophical discussions of the matter, though 
regularly focusing on the physical sciences, have recently drawn examples 
from the social sciences (especially from psychology, what is dubbed a 
‘special science’) as cases meant to bolster one side of the debate or other. 
Underlying this is the assumption that realism in the physical sciences as 
specified by innumerable books and papers on the matter is the same as 
realism in the social sciences—with the term ‘scientific realism’ used as a 
blanket term to cover all manner of realist commitments in the sciences. This 
assumption—with the character of the subject matter the social sciences 
concern themselves with being very different from that of the physical 
sciences—is highly dubious. 
This thesis constitutes an attempt at giving realist commitments in the 
social sciences their due. In this dissertation, I intend to (a) properly articulate 
realist commitments in the social sciences through the clear definition of what 
I term social scientific realism, (b) spell out the exact nature of the objects of 
inquiry in the social sciences, and with these resources (c) ultimately provide a 
reason for thinking social scientific realism true. 
My argument in the subsequent chapters is as follows. 
In Chapter II, I define social scientific realism through a consideration 
of what we know of scientific realism. Here I reveal how mistaken 
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philosophers have been to gloss over any potential differences between realist 
commitments in the physical and social sciences. Social scientific realism, it is 
discovered, is committed to the objects of social scientific inquiry exhibiting 
emergence. 
With the notion of emergence being a philosophically provocative one, 
Chapter III explores emergence by outlining its general features and the lines 
along which different accounts of the notion can be divided. With help from 
our articulation of social scientific realism in II, I point out that the account of 
emergence that best gels with realist commitments in the social sciences is that 
of the general ontological supervenience account of emergence and defend it 
from critics who charge it with epiphenomenalism. The specification of the 
account of emergence to use in our understanding of social scientific realism 
sheds more light on the view and bolsters its credibility. 
Chapter IV, the final substantive chapter, broaches the last crucial issue 
of this thesis—whether we have any reason to endorse social scientific 
realism. To answer this question, I elucidate the nature of the objects of social 
scientific inquiry, arguing that they are best thought of as kinds. Even though 
philosophical talk of kinds has been dominated heavily by talk of natural 
kinds, I contend that what is actually relevant to the truth of social scientific 
realism is whether such social scientific kinds are, as Ian Hacking terms it, 
interactive kinds—which they indeed are. Ultimately, with this new 
information and the philosophical resources obtained in previous chapters, I 
formulate in great detail an argument that, to my mind, provides us a 








To discuss realist commitments in the social sciences is to approach 
relatively novel and unfamiliar philosophical territory; what I term social 
scientific realism will require a definition and the most prudent way to go 
about providing one is by looking at its precursor—scientific realism. In this 
chapter I first spell out scientific realism through an analysis of the reasons for 
its discussion in philosophy—the presence of unobservables and 
underdetermination—and its appeals as a view, ultimately outlining its 
defining themes and theses. Here I also defend talk of the realism-anti-realism 
debate from detractors who insist that the difference between these views is 
based on the purportedly dubious observable-unobservable distinction—I deny 
that this distinction is dubious at all. I then articulate social scientific realism 
through an analysis of how the reasons for discussion about realism are greater 
and how realist and anti-realist concerns are more pressing with regard to the 
social sciences—uncovering how different the view really is from its 
counterpart in the physical sciences. Ultimately, this discussion leads to an 
elucidation of social scientific realism’s defining themes and theses—most 




2.1 Scientific Realism 
 
 
Scientific realism is a class of positions about the ontological status of 
the structures and entities that the physical sciences purport to exist—namely 
that these constitute a mind-independent reality that the physical sciences 
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accurately portray. Crudely, realism construes the physical sciences as being 
in the business of ‘truth’. (I will henceforth use the term ‘scientific realism’ to 
refer to realism with regard to the physical sciences.) 
 
2.1.1 Reasons for discussion/dispute 
 
When spelled out this way, scientific realism seems like the default and 
almost obviously correct interpretation of the scientific enterprise. After all, 
who would contest that trees, rocks, and the myriad objects science claims to 
refer to actually exist? The issue, however, is a little more complicated than 
our question lets on. There are two major reasons why scientific realism may 
not be as ‘obviously true’ as it seems.  
Anti-realists deny scientific realism, not on the basis of trees and rocks, 
but on the basis of entities and structures that the physical sciences articulate 
that are not directly observable. Some of these entities and structures such as 
electrons and wave functions are admittedly in a sense ‘observable’—
electrons, for example, can be ‘observed’ in a cloud chamber by looking for 
the vapour trails it leaves behind. Yet strictly speaking one is not observing the 
electron at all (in much the same way looking at the smoke trails of a jet 
engine is not observing the engine itself). Consequently, while it may be easily 
admitted that trees, tables, et cetera exist (save for perhaps idealists), it may be 
more contentious as to whether electrons, wave functions, et cetera, none of 
which have ever been directly observed, actually exist outside of our scientific 
theorising. In a sense, anti-realists are asking what justifies extending the 
ontological status accorded to observables to directly unobservables 
(henceforth merely ‘unobservables’) when epistemic access to the latter is of a 
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substantially different and potentially more dubious nature than access to the 
former. 
This contentiousness is compounded by the possibility of 
underdetermination—where sometimes different unobservables are used in 
competing mutually-exclusive theories that, despite their internal differences, 
are equally explanatorily potent—i.e. they all ‘fit’ the empirical data. In such 
scenarios, anti-realists are in a sense asking what justifies extending the 
ontological status accorded to observables to unobservables when the 
explanandum can be equally accounted for by different theoretical 
unobservables. 
 
2.1.2 Appeals of the view 
 
Yet despite the aforementioned problems, scientific realism remains an 
often held position among philosophers (and scientists) for two major reasons.  
(SA1) Knowledge claims: Scientific realism best aligns with 
the often-held view of the physical sciences as making 
contributions to the total pool of human knowledge and not 
merely as an increasingly complex exercise in classification and 
organisation of experiential knowledge. The physical sciences, 
the sentiment goes, is not philately. 
 
(SA2) Claims of progression: Scientific realism best aligns with 
the sentiment that the physical sciences are going somewhere—
they make increasing contributions to the pool of human 
knowledge. (It is likely this sentiment stems from the 
increasing technological advancement and standards of living 
that have been attributed to the apparent headway made in the 
physical sciences.) 
 
These appeals of scientific realism, though not strictly arguments in favour of 
the view, nonetheless deserve mention. After all, any attempt to spell out the 
view in greater detail should allow for what makes it so appealing to begin 
with. A characterisation of scientific realism that, for example, is articulated to 
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be less susceptible to anti-realist criticisms may be impoverished nonetheless 
if it does so at the expense of what made realism attractive as the default 
position. 
 
2.1.3 General themes 
 
Consequently, it is thought that any realist commitment in the physical 
sciences that allows for the appeals identified above must be characterised by 
three general themes. 
(ST1) Convergence: The many pictures of the world that 
physical scientific theories paint and successively alter are 
converging, with increasingly greater degrees of accuracy, 
toward how the world actually is. Crudely, the physical 
sciences are ‘getting closer to the truth’. 
 
(ST2) Mind-Independence: The counterfactual “if humans did 
not exist or engaged in discovery of and about the world 
differently, then the entities and structures that are reported by 
the physical sciences would still exist” is true—i.e. the 
theoretical entities and structures the physical sciences claim to 
exist do so independently of us. Crudely, what we think of 
electrons or wave functions has no bearing on their existence or 
their characteristics. 
 
(ST3) Objectivity: Work in the physical sciences constitutes 
attempts to discover objective facts about the world—i.e. these 
facts about the world are not merely a matter of perspective. 
(Though it seems like objectivity and mind-independence 
necessarily go together, the two can come apart as shall later be 
seen.)1 
 
We can see that ST2 and ST3 provide for SA1: the supposed objective mind-
independent status of theoretical entities and structures postulated by the 
physical sciences means that scientific claims that invoke such entities and 
structures can indeed contribute to the total pool of human knowledge—i.e. 
                                                             
1 I am aware that the notion of ‘objectivity’ has been subject to significant philosophical 
debate—it seems that there may be no ‘objective’ way to understand ‘objectivity’. This, 
however, is a debate I will not go into as I believe my construal of the notion as spelled out in 
ST3 will suffice for my purposes. For further reading, see Richard Rorty, Objectivity, 
Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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they may yield true reports of actually existing objects. Furthermore, ST1 and 
ST3 provide for SA2: that accounts in science are supposedly converging 
towards an objective reality means that scientific claims are indeed making 
increasing contributions to human knowledge—i.e. science really is getting 
closer to the truth. 
 
2.1.4 Scientific realism & anti-realism defined 
 
From the more general themes that run through scientific realism we 
finally derive a more specific articulation of what the view entails. While the 
term ‘scientific realism’ no longer designates a single philosophical position 
but instead currently covers a cluster of realist views, most realist 
commitments with regard to the physical sciences appear to be characterised at 
least by the following three theses.2 
(S1) The metaphysical thesis: The world has a definite 
objective mind-independent structure. 
 
(S2) The semantic thesis: Descriptions by our best theories in 
the physical sciences should be taken literally—“[t]heoretical 
assertions are not reducible to claims about the behaviour of 
observables nor are they instrumental devices for establishing 
connexions between observables”. Such assertions 
consequently possess an alethic value (i.e. are capable of being 
true or false) as they “have putative factual reference”.3 
 
(S3) The epistemic thesis: Our best and most successful 
theories or models in the physical sciences are justifiably 
thought to be approximately true of the world. We have good 
reason to believe that the entities and/or relations they posit 
really do exist—i.e. to think that such successful theoretical 
claims constitute knowledge of the world. 
 
                                                             
2 I modify these from Stathis Psillos, “Introduction”, Scientific Realism: How science tracks 




We should also properly articulate what denying scientific realism as spelled 
out above involves.4  
Accept/Deny/Remain Silent on the metaphysical thesis: It is 
inconsequential whether anti-realists accept or deny this thesis 
as the crux of the position is that we do not have sufficient 
empirical access to certain entities and structures postulated by 
the physical sciences such that even if the world had a definite 
objective mind-independent structure we would not know 
anything about it beyond the observable domain. 
 
Deny the semantic thesis: Assertions made in the physical 
sciences are not always to be taken at face-value. Since we do 
not have adequate empirical access to unobservables such as to 
be sure of their ontological status, theories that make claims 
about unobservables should be taken to be, at best, merely 
heuristic devices (instruments for classification and prediction) 
or, at worst, short-hand for the relations we ascribe between 
observable phenomena. 
 
Deny the epistemic thesis: To ask if claims made in the 
physical sciences are true or false of the world is to make a 
(category) mistake. These claims are non-factive and do not 





Having defined scientific realism (and its naysaying counterpart), two 
qualifications about the view—qualifications that also carry forward into 
realism in the social sciences—must be made. 
Firstly, scientific realism limits its scope by extending the realist 
commitment only to our best scientific theories. These are usually theories that 
have displayed a certain ‘maturity’—not just in that they have survived 
repeated testing over time but also in that they have survived (what Stathis 
Psillos calls) the ‘take-off point’ of the discipline in question. The ‘take-off 
point’ of a discipline is “characterised by the presence of a body of well-
entrenched background beliefs [(of which mature theories inform or are part)] 
                                                             
4 See Jarett Leplin, “Realism and Novelty”, A Novel Defence of Scientific Realism (New York: 
Oxford University Press), pp. 98-135. 
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about the domain of inquiry which, in effect, delineate the boundaries of that 
domain, inform theoretical research and constrain the proposal of theories and 
hypotheses”.5 Our ‘best theories’ are also informed by their predictive success 
of (especially novel) phenomena. Here, novel predictions include not only 
predictions of new phenomena but also new predictions and accounts of 
already known phenomena.6 
Secondly, scientific realists are committed not to the epistemic claim 
that our best scientific theories are true simpliciter but that we have good 
reason to think them approximately true. Realists are quick to accept that it is 
quite possible that even some of our best scientific theories—even by the 
standards set out above—are likely to be plain wrong. Some of this has to do 
with the crude acknowledgement that what was yesterday’s best theory is now 
considered incorrect or at least highly inaccurate in its depiction of the 
physical world. Miasmatic theory, for example, certainly displayed maturity (it 
was conceived sometime around the 1st century and survived through the 
middle ages) and showed some predictive success in explaining disease 
contraction and prevention yet is now considered to be highly inaccurate in its 
understanding of disease transmission. There are, however, other more subtle 
motivations for such fallibilism: much of our scientific theorising and 
modelling involves a high degree of abstraction and idealisation. And much of 
this is by design: ideal values are often assumed or minuscule systems are 
abstracted away from the larger picture for the purposes of experimentation 
and calculation. So even our best theories may be (highly) inaccurate when 
compared to concrete instances of the real world phenomena upon which they 
                                                             
5 Psillos, “Resisting the Pessimistic Induction”, op. cit., pp. 96-109. Quote taken from p. 102. 
6 Ibid., pp. 100 & 101. 
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are based. Accordingly, scientific realists do not insist that all our best theories 
are true but maintain that (even if all our current best theories were wildly 
incorrect) we would have good reason(s) to think them approximately true and 
maintain a realist stance towards the work done in the physical sciences. 
Attendant to this is the notion of approximate truth. The possibility remains 
open that even if science is ‘getting closer to the truth’ it may never actually 
result in true simpliciter characterisations of the world. This may be due, as 
stated earlier, to the way the scientific enterprise as a whole is conducted—
with abstractions and idealisations—that precludes ever getting it ‘perfectly 
right’. Whatever the reason, realists are well aware that it might be that even 
our best theories can only ever be justifiably claimed to be approximately 
true.7 
 
2.1.6 The observable-unobservable distinction 
 
In our foregoing articulation of scientific realism, we must not lose 
sight of our goal set out at the start of this chapter—to articulate social 
scientific realism. Our discussion thus far is meant to be in service of that goal. 
However, before discussing what realism in the social sciences may look like, 
the distinction between realist and anti-realist views (in the physical sciences 
or otherwise) must be defended. As mentioned earlier, anti-realists (in general) 
are realists with regard to the observables that the physical sciences theorise 
about but anti-realists with regard to the unobservable theoretical entities and 
structures to which we have no direct empirical access. Attendant to this is the 
                                                             
7 Some may find the distinction articulated here—that scientific realists are committed not to 
the claim that our best scientific theories are true but to the claim that that we have good 
reason to think them approximately true—to be a spurious one: generally if one has a good 
reason to believe that p, then one should believe that p. As I have already explained in my 
discussion, I do not believe the distinction to be spurious. If it is however, the removal of this 
qualification has no real bearing on how I eventually argue for social scientific realism 
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question of whether there truly exists this observable-unobservable distinction. 
This is a crucial question that needs to be answered as the distinction is partly 
what gives rise to realist-anti-realist debates (in the physical sciences or 
otherwise)—if the distinction is indeed dubious then perhaps our project to 
articulate and discuss social scientific realism (or any project that discusses 
even scientific realism for that matter) may be a waste of time. 
Grover Maxwell famously argued that the observable-unobservable 
distinction is a vague one. According to him, “looking through a windowpane, 
looking through glasses, looking through binoculars, looking through a low-
power microscope, looking through a high-power microscope, et cetera” all lie 
on a continuum across which any line drawn demarcating the observable from 
the unobservable would be arbitrary.8 Consequently, whether an entity or 
structure is observable or not may not always have a clear answer as any 
difference, should there be any, between observables and unobservables would 
be a difference in degree and not in kind. If Maxwell is right, then perhaps to 
ask the anti-realist question posed earlier—to ask what justifies extending the 
ontological status accorded to observables to unobservables when epistemic 
access to the latter is of a substantially different and potentially more dubious 
nature than access to the former—is to be mistaken since epistemic access to 
both observables and unobservables are not substantially different from one 
another. 
Thankfully, Bas van Fraassen has defended the distinction. To think 
that because a difference is one of degree or that the existence of ‘hard’ cases 
precludes a proper distinction is to be mistaken. van Fraassen himself points 
                                                             
8 Grover Maxwell, “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities”, Minnesota Studies in the 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3 (1962), pp. 3-15. Quote on p. 7. 
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out the wrongness of this reasoning by citing Sextus Empiricus’ ridiculous 
argument that incestuous activity and touching the toe of one’s mother differ 
only in degree and therefore neither are immoral.9 There are better examples: 
it is not the case that there is no genuine distinction between thinness and 
fatness merely because these are concepts that differ in degree. The distinction 
is similarly not undermined solely in virtue of the existence of ‘hard’ cases—
cases that sit in the middle of the thin-fat continuum and are hard to attribute 
either predicate to. The same applies to hirsuteness and baldness. Neither the 
vagueness of these hard cases nor the mere fact that the concepts occupy a 
continuum shows that there is no real distinction as long as there remain 
clear-cut cases occupying their respective polar ends of the spectrum—the 
anorexically thin versus the clinical obese and the Elvis-esquely hirsute versus 
the Yul Brynner-bald. In the case of the observable-unobservable distinction, 
van Frassen points out that there remain entities and structures which are 
clearly observable—tennis balls, car crashes, Jupiter through a telescope—and 
those which are clearly not—micro-particles.10 
van Fraassen’s reply appears convincingly sufficient for realist-anti-
realist debates to proceed without articulating perhaps necessary and/or 
sufficient conditions for something to count as observable or unobservable. 
Focus is often shifted to the easy cases where observable (or unobservable) 
status can be readily attributed (quarks, electrons, et cetera versus the familiar 
objects of our everyday experience or ‘medium-sized dry goods’ á la J. L. 
Austin). After all, if scientific realists are right about the ontological status of 
                                                             
9 Bas van Fraassen, “Arguments Concerning Scientific Realism”, The Scientific Image 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), pp. 6-40.  Van Fraassen’s discussion of the distinction is on pp. 
13-19. 
10 Ibid., pp. 15-17. 
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clearly unobservable entities or structures postulated in the physical sciences, 
then the distinction matters little for the purposes of discussion. Only if anti-
realism is correct in its assertions then should we make attempts to articulate 
the distinction so that we would have a line in the sand as to where with regard 
to the physical sciences we should stop being realists. 
 
 
2.2 Social Scientific Realism 
 
 
In the previous section, I have slowly articulated in a step-by-step 
manner what a realist commitment in the physical sciences looks like. I first 
provided a common-sense definition of scientific realism as a crude starting 
point. I then raised reasons as to why the truth of scientific realism is subject 
to some dispute before pointing out some of the appeals that the view holds. 
With the view’s appeals in mind, I identified some themes that are present in 
any realist view of the physical sciences and ultimately provided a detailed 
articulation of scientific realism and its theses and what exactly about these 
theses anti-realists find unpalatable. One would think that retracing these steps 
with the social sciences in mind would just as easily yield an understanding of 
what a realist commitment with regard to the social sciences would look like. 
Yet doing so reveals how different kettles of fish the social sciences are and its 
corresponding realism might be from that of the physical sciences. 
Suppose that we were to reuse what we said earlier in my crude initial 
characterisation of scientific realism as a template for understanding what 
social scientific realism is committed to. We would then have: “Social 
scientific realism is a class of positions about the ontological status of the 
structures and entities that the social sciences purport to exist—namely that 
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these constitute a mind-independent reality that the social sciences accurately 
portray”. The problem with taking this as a starting point is that this is patently 
false. Many entities and structures dealt with in the social sciences, unlike 
most of their counterparts in the physical sciences, are clearly not mind-
independent (nor are they claimed by social scientists to be)—bonds, debt, 
dramaturgical identity, political treason, et cetera all may be terribly different 
or may not have existed at all had human beings not existed or studied social 
phenomena differently. Perhaps a broader brush stroke is required to first gain 
a foothold on what a (philosophically interesting) social scientific realist 
commitment might be—the broadest of which might be to distil such a 
commitment down to the claim that “the entities and structures of inquiry in 
the social sciences are ‘real’ ”. However this too is of little help. In one sense, 
states, bonds, and other objects of social scientific inquiry (henceforth ‘social 
scientific objects’) are ‘real’ in that they clearly interact with and effect 
change in the world—bond markets affect buying and selling decisions and 
states interact with other states to perhaps create a new one. These interactions 
are not limited only to social scientific phenomena but can affect the wider 
physical nature of our world—state policies can result in massive deforestation 
or the creation of huge areas of new flora. Yet in another sense, the objects of 
social scientific inquiry surely are not ‘real’ in the way that we think trees, 
tables, and other medium-sized dry goods real—one cannot point to a bond or 
debt in the same way one can point out trees and tables. Furthermore, social 
scientific objects also do not seem ‘real’ in the way scientific realists think 
electrons are. While scientific realists may think electrons exist in exactly the 
same manner as do trees, even they might hesitate to make similar claims 
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about social scientific objects—debt certainly does not seem to exist in space-
time in the same way trees do. It appears that none of these crude 
characterisations of social scientific realism cast the view in any 
philosophically interesting light. 
One might think that in philosophy such obviously true or false 
positions are positions unworthy of our time. Should further attempts at 
articulating what constitutes social scientific realism fail to yield definitions of 
fruitful consequence, then perhaps to ask questions of realism in the social 
sciences is to make a category mistake—one should not force realist/anti-
realist concerns that are not there. Yet even without a more detailed definition 
of social scientific realism, we can see that these concerns are there and are 
certainly not forced. In fact, despite the initial inability to successfully 
articulate (even crudely) what social scientific realism is committed to, it 
seems that the reasons for discussion here are perhaps even greater than those 
for discussing realism in the physical sciences. 
 
2.2.1 Greater reason for discussion—unobservability 
 
The first issue anti-realists took up with realists in the physical 
sciences was the ontological status of entities and structures that are not 
directly given to us through observation. This concern may be even more 
pressing here since most, if not all, objects of social scientific inquiry do not 
seem directly observable. Now I must admit that this is prima facie a highly 
contentious claim. While most will agree with such a claim with regard to 
some social scientific objects such as debt or dramaturgical identity, few will 
agree with it simpliciter. What follows is a slight discursion discussing two 
sets of examples of social scientific objects to bolster my claim. 
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The first set of examples consists of social scientific objects that are 
not directly related to the physical sciences. Take, for example, the notion of 
the political state. These, to my mind, are not directly observable. A polity 
endures beyond changes in office-holders and states are not equal to the mere 
grouping of human beings that constitute them at a given time. One cannot in 
a strict sense be said to observe the former merely by observing the latter. 
States then are in a sense like electrons—we observe agglomerations of human 
beings and their effects and infer that there are things known as ‘states’ in 
much the same way we observe vapour trails in cloud chambers and infer that 
there are things known as ‘electrons’. Yet what of other social scientific 
objects like persons and money? We see persons on the street and see and 
touch money in our pockets. Surely these are directly observable. I contend 
that even these are not and I suspect that thinking otherwise in each of these 
cases is borne, like in the case of states though less obviously so, out of a 
conflation between what is directly observed and the actual object of social 
scientific inquiry. Take the sociological concept of persons, “the socially 
defined, publicly visible beings of intersubjective experience”.11 The 
sociological person is one that is shaped by society, that interacts with other 
persons on a social level, and whose performances are available for all to see. 
A person is not equal to a mere homo sapiens and to observe the latter is not to 
observe the former (with all its accompanying social and moral implications). 
The case of money, our last example in this set, is similar: the money in our 
wallets is not money as social scientific object. What we directly observe 
when opening our wallets are nothing more that printed pieces of paper. We 
                                                             
11 Spencer E. Cahill, “Toward a Sociology of the Person”, Sociological Theory, Vol. 16, No.2 
(July 1997), pp. 131-148. 
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have learnt to identify which pieces of paper can be exchanged for goods as 
services—even perhaps noticing that pieces of paper most likely to be valued 
are ones with certain styles of embossed intaglio print. Yet observation of 
these pieces of paper as money, even if with these physical characteristics in 
mind, is never an observation of money with its accompanying notions of 
being debt-backed and so on. Such pieces of paper are merely material 
manifestations of a series of social processes and arrangements which 
themselves cannot be directly observed. 
In the first set of examples, there is an equivocation between social 
scientific terms designating the original social scientific objects of inquiry and 
social scientific terms as co-opted into everyday language and used loosely. In 
the same way ‘DNA’ has been co-opted to refer to anything from design 
similarities between products to the passing on of corporate culture from one 
CEO to the next, social scientific terms have been ported into daily usage 
though sometimes without the term’s original precision. No doubt many social 
scientific terms have been and will continue to be co-opted into common-place 
use given the closeness of the social sciences’ subject matter to our daily lives. 
The point is that this leads to confusion—certain objects designated by co-
opted social scientific terms are indeed directly observable, though the actual 
objects of social scientific inquiry they designate are not. 
The second set of examples comes from psychology. The discipline of 
psychology, with its close relationship with the physical sciences of biology 
and neurophysiology, might seem to provide proof that not all objects of social 
scientific inquiry are unobservable. Consider psychological disorders as our 
prime example here. We certainly directly observe the patterned behaviours 
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associated with them, making psychological disorders a far trickier matter to 
dispel as unobservable. On the one hand, mental disorders are commonly 
equated with clearly observable behavioural patterns. Even the prevailing 
standard in psychology by which such disorders are classified, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), eschews etiology in 
favour of symptom-based diagnoses.12 On the other hand, the classification of 
mental disorders has been admitted to be (statistical-)norm-governed and the 
product of value judgements.13 Consequently, it is plausible to think that 
psychological disorders are not strictly the same as the patterns of behaviour 
they are associated with even if they are said to be defined thusly. Here is 
why: contrast psychological disorders with a physical ailment such as the flu 
which is both etiologically and symptomally defined. One has the flu when 
one displays certain symptoms and when there are specific reasons for those 
symptoms regardless of whether one (or even wider society) values having 
them. When defining mental disorders in terms of behavioural patterns 
without etiological backing, one cherry picks which behaviours to include as 
part of that pattern cluster since a person with a given disorder obviously 
behaves in ways not limited to those spelled out by the disorder’s diagnostic 
criteria. Which behaviours get lumped together into a given disorder is, as 
stated earlier, a statistical-norm-governed matter. Whether one has a disorder 
is then defined not purely in terms of observable behaviour, but also in terms 
of a certain statistical norm. So strictly speaking to directly observe certain 
                                                             
12 Robin Murray, The Essentials of Postgraduate Psychiatry (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
13 G.E. Berrios, “Classifications in psychiatry: a conceptual history”, Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 33, No.2 (April 1999), pp. 145-160. 
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behaviours alone is not to directly observe a psychological disorder as the 
latter qua social scientific object is not limited to behavioural patterns alone. 
It is possible that some readers may remain unconvinced by any of 
what I have said. Recall, however, that the original point of this discussion on 
the observable/unobservable status of social scientific objects is to emphasise 
the need to further pursue the topic of realism/anti-realism in the social 
sciences and it is to this end I believe I have succeeded regardless of whether 
the reader agrees with me. 
Suppose that as it turns out the reader agrees with my discussion of the 
status of social scientific objects—that they are indeed not directly 
observable—in which case she should also agree that any concerns that anti-
realists have about the ontological status of unobservables in the physical 
sciences carry over. The concerns would be even more pressing here since all 
objects of social scientific inquiry are unobservable. 
Now, suppose that as it turns out the reader only partially agrees with 
my assessment of social scientific objects—that most or perhaps only a 
handful of them are not directly observable—in which case she should also 
agree that the afore-mentioned concerns would still apply. Admittedly how 
pressing these concerns are would vary with the number of unobservables 
postulated in social scientific literature. 
Finally, suppose that as it turns out the reader disagrees with me 
entirely—insisting that all objects of social scientific inquiry are directly 
observable—in which case things get more interesting. Recall that in the case 
of scientific realism, philosophers have clear-cut non-disputed cases of 
observable and unobservable entities and structures in the physical sciences. 
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The physical objects and structures whose observable status they disagree on 
are ‘hard cases’. Similarly, that philosophers disagree on the 
observable/unobservable status of social scientific objects means that these 
objects are ‘hard cases’ which either sit towards the middle of the observable-
unobservable spectrum or perhaps perplexingly do not sit on it altogether 
(perhaps to ask if such objects are observable is to make a category mistake). 
In either case, the ontological status of such social scientific objects remains 
an open question—in the former because we do not know with sufficient 
confidence if such objects are truly observable and in the latter because we 
would not even have the observable-unobservable distinction at our disposal 
as a starting point. So even if the reader disagrees with me entirely, she should 




2.2.2 Greater reason for discussion—underdetermination 
 
The second issue anti-realists took up with realists in the physical 
sciences was with regard to underdetermination—the same explanandum may 
sometimes have different explanans invoking mutually-exclusive theoretical 
unobservables. With the ontological status of (some or all) social scientific 
objects being called into question, that concern also arises here. Sometimes 
certain social scientific postulates are used in competing, mutually exclusive 
theories that, despite their internal differences, are equally explanatorily 
potent—i.e. they all ‘fit’ the empirical data. In the case of the physical 
sciences, despite being stated as a reason for doubting scientific realism, this 
rarely occurs. Usually new findings show either that one theory is merely a 
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limiting case of another (as was the case with Newtonian mechanics and 
Einstein’s theories) and they are thus not mutually exclusive or that one theory 
explains more than another and thus there is a difference in explanatory 
potency. The social sciences are, however, quite different in this regard.  
For one thing, there appears to be much more disagreement in the 
social sciences than in the physical sciences at present. Discussions 
surrounding the controversial nature of psychological disorder diagnoses 
(mentioned earlier) is a prime example of such disagreement—and in the 
social scientific discipline thought most similar to the physical sciences at that. 
Granted, the state of (dis)agreement in the social sciences could be chalked up 
to their infancy relative to the physical sciences. One would think or hope that 
with time these disagreements would be ironed out. Nonetheless, concerns 
over the ontological status of the objects of social scientific inquiry are 
compounded now by present disagreements over theory and their postulates. 
Furthermore, even if we were to hold out in the hope that an 
increasingly mature discipline may iron out internal disagreements, the nature 
of phenomena studied by the social sciences may make it hard to ever get rid 
of disagreement in certain cases. Physical phenomena are potentially more 
available than social scientific phenomena. Trees and rocks will likely always 
be around for study and even transient phenomena (like certain man-made 
radioactive elements) are, in most cases, repeatably producible. Even physical 
phenomena that may not always be around (global warming for example 
(hopefully)) are available long enough for the purposes of study and ruling out 
alternative explanations of them. Social scientific phenomena are in certain 
cases one-off events (the rise of Marxism, Fascism, and Nazism) and even if 
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repeatable may not be ethically so (early experiments in psychology are 
excellent examples of this). This potential unavailability of social scientific 
phenomena may make ‘holding out’ in the hopes that new findings will 
eliminate alternative explanations futile since the phenomena necessary to 
obtain such findings may be long gone. Should competing theories with 
different postulates remain after ‘phenomena-expiration’, then the ontological 
status of those postulates would remain dubious. 
 
2.2.3 Why realist/anti-realist concerns are concerns at all 
 
So it seems that the realist/anti-realist concerns present in the physical 
sciences are even more so in the social sciences. On the matter of 
unobservables, either there are more unobservables postulated by the social 
sciences than in the physical sciences or the observable-unobservable status of 
social scientific objects is yet unsettled. On the matter of underdetermination, 
the greater actual disagreement among social scientists and the potentially 
transient nature of social scientific phenomena may make underdetermination 
a far greater problem in the social sciences than in the physical sciences. Both 
concerns cast doubt on the ontological status of social scientific objects. In 
fact, establishing that such concerns remain present (or are even more so) in 
the social sciences tells us that our quest to define social scientific realism is 
not a futile one—philosophers dubious about the existence of certain entities 
and structures in the physical sciences should remain dubious or perhaps be 
even more so of those in the social sciences. We also now know that our 
previous attempt at definition is not completely off the mark—the definition 
should be concerned with the existence of social scientific objects. Of course, 
articulating social scientific realism as merely the view that “the entities and 
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structures of inquiry in the social sciences ‘exist’ ” is just as uninformative as 
our previous definition that they are ‘real’. Surely they exist in one sense—
creating and being subject to associated physical phenomena—without 
existing in the same way physical objects do. 
Here our previously discussed realist/anti-realist concerns may yet 
yield more resources to aid us in defining social scientific realism. We know 
that the observable/unobservable status of entities and structures in the social 
sciences and the presence of underdetermined theories that invoke them are 
concerns precisely because they make such entities and structures 
ontologically dubious. Yet why should that matter? For the same reasons 
discussed previously that made similar concerns pernicious to the physical 
sciences (and that consequently made scientific realism seem so appealing). 
(SSA1) Knowledge claims: The often-held view is that the 
social sciences are like the physical sciences in that they 
similarly make contributions to the total pool of human 
knowledge, and it would be difficult (to say the least) for the 
social sciences to be said to make knowledge claims if their 
reports invoking the existence of certain social scientific 
entities and structures were not actually true, i.e. those entities 
and structures did not actually exist in some manner of 
consequence. 
 
(SSA2) Claims of progression: Furthermore, the social 
sciences, like the physical sciences, are frequently thought of as 
making increasing contributions to the pool of human 
knowledge—sociologists would like to think that they know 
more today about conflict theory than Marx, psychologists 
more today about mental illness than Freud, and economists 
more today about macroeconomic rigidity than Keynes. This 
sentiment would, again, be difficult to maintain should it turn 
out that social scientific objects do not exist in some manner of 
consequence. 
 
That the social sciences are thought of as making knowledge claims 
that progressively increase sheds light on the sort of ‘existence’ of social 
scientific objects that we are interested in as whichever way we articulate 
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social scientific realism should allow for these sentiments. How many ways 
then can the entities and structures of inquiry in the social sciences be said to 
‘exist’? There are three: (i) they could be said to exist in the sense that they are 
merely aggregations of wholly physical phenomena (e.g. ‘culture’ is merely 
the aggregated dress, movement, and speech patterns of a large group); (ii) 
they could be said to exist in the sense that they are emergent results of such 
aggregations of wholly physical phenomena (‘culture’ though constituted by 
the aggregated dress, movement, and speech patterns of a group are not 
identical to it); (iii) they could be said to exist in the sense that they are extant 
objects completely separate from physical phenomena (‘culture’ exists on its 
own above and beyond the mere dress, movement, and speech patterns of the 
group it describes). Which of these three allow for SSA1 and SSA2? Here, (i) 
seems to falter—should (i) be the case, many claims in the social sciences 
would fail to add to the pool of human knowledge. The statement “culture is 
malleable”, for example, would yield no new understanding of our world. 
Individuals change their attire, movements, and turn-of-phrase all the time—
why should a group of them do any different? Culture, on this reading being a 
mere aggregation of these behaviours, would of course be malleable—hardly 
an enlightening discovery. Furthermore, some social scientific claims would 
fail to count as knowledge claims simply because they would make no sense. I 
know not how to make sense of the term ‘cultural conflict’ should culture 
merely be aggregated individual behaviours. The phrase makes even less sense 
when applied to the internal struggle experienced by an individual—say, for 
example, a second-generation Sino-American. (iii) seems to side-step these 
issues though there is little point in discussing how since (iii) has its own 
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glaring problem—it is just plain odd. Even though sociologists may speak as if 
culture has a life of its own, it is absurd to think that it exists in its own 
platonic realm apart from human behaviour. The absurdity of (iii) is made 
even more evident if we were to switch to an example from psychology—no 
one (I am willing to wager even the most hard core of dualists included) thinks 
mental illness completely divorced from human physiology. So it appears we 
are left with (ii)—and (ii) certainly appears to fit the bill. It does not make 
claims about a platonic realm of social scientific entities and structures yet, 
because it acknowledges that such entities and structures are ones that emerge 
from and are not identical to physical phenomena, allows for social scientific 
knowledge claims that say something genuinely novel about our world and 
hence add to the total pool of human knowledge. Now we finally have the 
resources to provide our first working definition of social scientific realism. 
Social scientific realism is a view about the ontological status of the 
structures and entities that the social sciences purport to exist—namely 
that these are systems that constitute an emergent reality that the social 
sciences accurately portray. 
 
On this view, the social sciences, just like their counterparts the physical 
sciences, are in the business of ‘truth’. 
 
2.2.4 General themes 
 
Articulating the general themes of social scientific realism will help to 
develop on our working definition of the view. 
(SST1) Convergence: The pictures of the emergent reality that 
social scientific theories paint and successively alter are 
converging, with increasingly greater degrees of accuracy, 
toward how this reality actually is. Crudely, the social sciences 
are ‘getting closer to the truth’. 
 
(SST2) Mind-Dependence: The counterfactual “if humans did 
not exist or engaged in discovery of and about the world 
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differently, then the emergent entities and structures that are 
reported by the social sciences would still exist and in their 
current form” is false. This is false not only because of the 
obvious fact that social scientific objects would not exist 
without us, but also because of how our study of social 
scientific phenomena can change the phenomena in question 
(this is precisely why psychologists include deception in some 
of their experiments). 
 
(SST3) Objectivity: Work in the social sciences constitutes 
attempts to discover objective emergent facts about the world. 
Though emergent social scientific entities and structures are 
mind-dependent, the theories that invoke them are taken to be 
objective fact and not merely a matter of perspective. 
 
(SST4) Emergence: The objects of inquiry in the social 
sciences are distinct from the sum total of their physical 
phenomena parts. These objects are thus emergent objects that 
cannot be studied by looking at mere physical phenomena. 
 
We can see that the themes of a realist commitment in the social sciences 
show two striking differences from those that permeate scientific realism. The 
first more obvious difference is in SST2: social scientific realism is not 
committed to the existence of mind-independent social entities and structures. 
The objects of social scientific inquiry would certainly not have existed (or at 
least not in the form that we are familiar with) without us—this change needs 
little further explanation. The second difference, found in SST4, involves an 
articulation of the ontic nature of the entities and structures in question. 
Whereas garden-variety scientific realism takes it that unobservables exist in 
the same way other observables do, social scientific realism insists on no such 
similarity, instead asserting that social scientific objects exist differently from 
purely physical phenomena as emergent objects from said phenomena. 
Nonetheless, the themes that permeate social scientific realism appear 
to meet with prevailing sentiments about the social sciences as much as those 
of scientific realism meet with prevailing sentiments about the physical 
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sciences. SST3 and SST4 provide for SSA1: the objective status of emergent 
theoretical entities and structures postulated by the social sciences means that 
claims that invoke such entities and structures do indeed contribute to the total 
pool of human knowledge—i.e. they yield true reports of genuinely extant 
objects. Furthermore, SST1, SST3, and SST4 provide for SSA2: that accounts 
in the social sciences of an objective emergent reality are supposedly 
converging towards how that emergent reality actually is means that claims in 
the social sciences are making increasing contributions to human 
knowledge—i.e. the social sciences really are getting closer to the truth about 
this emergent reality. 
 
2.2.5 Social scientific realism & anti-realism defined 
 
We are finally equipped to derive a more specific articulation of what 
social scientific realism entails. Modifying our definition of scientific realism 
with what we now know about the social sciences, we are left with the 
following three theses 
(SS1) The metaphysical thesis: The world of social scientific 
inquiry is an emergent one—occupied by entities and structures 
that are distinct from the purely physical phenomena that 
constitute them—that, though mind-dependent, is objective. 
 
(SS2) The semantic thesis: Descriptions by our best theories in 
the social sciences should be taken literally—theoretical 
assertions are not somehow short-hand for claims about 
physical phenomena nor are they instrumental devices for 
establishing connexions between such phenomena. Such 
assertions consequently possess an alethic value (i.e. are 
capable of being true or false) as they have putative factual 
reference in the emergent world they attempt to describe. 
 
(SS3) The epistemic thesis: Our best and most successful 
theories or models in the social sciences are justifiably thought 
to be approximately true of this emergent world. We have good 
reason to believe that the entities and/or relations they posit 
really do exist beyond the mere physical phenomena that 
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constitute them—i.e. to think that such successful theoretical 
claims constitute knowledge. 
 
Just as there are detractors of scientific realism, proponents of what I term 
social scientific anti-realism may respond to the aforementioned theses as 
follows. 
Deny the metaphysical thesis: The entities and structures of 
social scientific inquiry do not exist in any manner above and 
beyond physical phenomena and the ‘world’ of social scientific 
inquiry may change according to perspective and is not 
objective. Since the crux of any contention between realists and 
anti-realists here is over whether there exists any emergent 
reality above and beyond mere physical phenomena, the anti-
realist position denies the emergent existence of social 
scientific entities and structures. 
 
Deny the semantic thesis: Assertions made in the social 
sciences are not to be taken literally. Since social scientific 
phenomena are simply physical phenomena, theories that 
invoke social scientific entities and structures do so as short-
hand for complicated aggregated physical phenomena. 
 
Deny the epistemic thesis/Accept a modified epistemic thesis: 
The anti-realist has two options with regard to the epistemic 
thesis. She can deny the thesis—since there is no emergent 
world of social scientific objects to speak of, statements in the 
social science that supposedly make knowledge claims about 
this world do not count as knowledge at all. She can 
alternatively accept a modified epistemic thesis—since there is 
no emergent world of social scientific objects and that these 
objects are merely short-hand for physical phenomena, social 
scientific claims constitute knowledge only in that they 
constitute knowledge of purely physical phenomena. 
 
Qualifications that were made with our articulation of scientific 
realism also apply here to social scientific realism. The realist commitment 
would be extended only to our best social scientific theories—those that show 
a certain maturity, have survived the discipline’s ‘take-off point’, and have a 
measure of predictive success. However as noted much earlier, the relative 
infancy of social scientific disciplines may limit the number of social scientific 
theories that count as the ‘best’. This brings us to the second qualification: the 
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infancy of such disciplines may make it even more plausible (than in the case 
of the physical sciences) that even the best theories are plain wrong about the 
emergent world. Hence a reasonable social scientific realist would be 
committed not to the claim that our social scientific theories are true of the 
emergent world they try to describe but that we have good reason to think 






So far I have articulated what realist commitments in both the physical 
sciences and the social sciences look like, using the former as a starting point 
for the latter. In both cases, common-sense notions of the respective views 
were taken as crude starting points and developed upon to yield detailed 
definitions. Social scientific realism was discovered to be somewhat different 
from its precursor scientific realism. Concerns—such as the unobservability of 
certain objects of inquiry and the underdetermination of theoretical 
unobservables by empirical data—that render scientific realism worthy of 
discussion are even greater in the case of the social sciences. Furthermore, 
social scientific realism is unlike scientific realism in that it is committed to 
the objects of inquiry in question being emergent ones that are not equal to 
their constituent parts described by the physical sciences. However, little has 
been said about the nature of this emergent existence. In fact, the notion of 
emergence itself is a controversial one. In what manner exactly are social 
scientific objects emergent? I consider this matter in the following chapter. 
                                                             







The concept of emergence is a highly contentious one—the joke has 
been made that a meeting of any number philosophers and scientists would 
host that many number of theories of emergence plus one. With such 
controversy over the notion, it is evident that the rudimentary understanding of 
an emergent object being more than and not equal to the sum of its parts needs 
to be expanded—especially if it is to be invoked in our definition of social 
scientific realism. 
Consequently in what follows I analyse the concept of emergence and 
articulate its most prominent features and the pressing questions which 
demarcate the many different accounts of the concept. Using the themes that 
characterise social scientific realism outlined previously as criteria, these 
questions are subsequently answered, helping us identify the account of 
emergence to be used in our definition of social scientific realism—the general 
ontological supervenience account of emergence. The account, not being 
without detractors, is then defended from charges of epiphenomenalism, 
allowing social scientific realists to adopt an understanding of emergence that 
is in fact credible. Ultimately, I will argue that the adoption of the general 
ontological supervenience account of emergence actually adds plausibility to 
social scientific realism. 
 
 
3.1 The Concept of Emergence 
 
 
We begin with a simple definition of emergence provided by Mark 
Bedau and Paul Humphreys. 
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“Emergence relates to phenomena that arise from and depend on 
some more basic phenomena yet are simultaneously autonomous 
from that base.”15 
 
This starting definition is of course not very instructive. All it tells us is that 
emergent phenomena are somehow distinct from which it is based upon—and 
even then not very much about the nature of this distinction. Bedau and 
Humphreys themselves suggest that furnishing some often cited examples of 
emergence may provide a better feel of the concept of emergence. 
Liquidity, transparency, and rigidity of water are said to be 
emergent from hydrogen and oxygen atoms and their properties 
when structured as H2O. 
 
Physical phase transitions—for example the superconductivity 
exhibited by certain metals and ceramics when cooled below a 
certain temperature—are often taken as crucial examples of 
emergence. 
 
Sand dunes and their characteristic sloping and rippling effect 
is commonly said to emerge from the interactions between sand 
grains, wind, and gravity. 
 
Flocking behaviour is taken to emerge from the rules followed 
by individual birds to avoid collision while staying close to 
other birds. 
 
Life is considered to be the paradigmatic example of 
emergence—life is said to emerge from the specific 
combination of atoms and molecules arranged in a highly 
specific and ordered manner. 
 
The ordering of these examples is no accidental matter. It is meant to point out 
how emergence is said to exist at all ‘levels’ of phenomena—from the 
microscopic level to the level of organism behaviour to the level of life itself. 
Whether these often cited cases are genuinely of emergence is admittedly up 
for debate. What we can glean, however, from our precursory look at 
purported cases of emergence are some general features of the concept. 
                                                             
15 Mark Bedau & Paul Humphreys, “Introduction”, Emergence: Contemporary Readings in 
Philosophy and Science, edited by Bedau & Humphreys (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 1-
6. The quote is on p. 1. 
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3.1.1 Features of emergence 
 
We can ascertain four general features of emergence. 
 
Emergent objects emerge from something else. This may seem 
too obvious to merit any attention though it is an important 
feature of emergence. In this sense the notion of emergence is a 




Emergent objects have some kind of autonomy over and above 
the things from which they emerge. This feature was pointed 
out earlier and is really the crux of emergence. As before, the 
ways in which emergent objects are autonomous from their 
base vary across different accounts of emergence. 
 
Emergent objects possess a certain kind of novelty. The idea 
here, borrowing an earlier example to illustrate, is that the 
liquidity and transparency of water are genuinely novel features 
of specific collections of hydrogen and oxygen atoms—features 
that would not be found if one were to look at isolated 
hydrogen and oxygen atoms. This emphasis on novelty meant 
that emergence used to be found only in the newest of 
discoveries and the least understood of fields of study—life, 
consciousness, biology, et cetera; as our example shows, now 
emergence is said to exist even at the levels very close to the 
fundamental.  
 
Emergent objects have some holistic aspect. Holism is 
commonly taken to amount to the adage that the whole is more 
than the sum of its parts. (The feature has become so 
synonymous with emergence that the adage has become a 
slogan for the concept.) Using another example, it is sometimes 
said that there is ‘something more’ to biological life than the 
mere arrangement of atoms and chronology of chemistry. 
Whether this sort of holism is metaphysical or epistemological 
remains to be seen. 
 
The problem is that any similarity between the many accounts of emergence 
ends with these four general features. These sometimes vastly different 
accounts of emergence stem from the different ways in which certain key 






3.1.2 The pressing questions of emergence 
 
These issues are best consolidated into the following six questions.16 
 
(Q1) What is the exact nature of the autonomy possessed by emergent objects 
over and above the things from which they emerge? Is this autonomy given by 
their irreducibility to basal phenomena? Or is it that emergent objects are 
unpredictable from information about their base and in this sense autonomous? 
Or is it perhaps that the autonomy is accounted for by the inexplicability of 
emergent phenomena from their base (i.e. an explanans consisting of only 
information about basal phenomena can never be considered adequate for the 
emergent explanandum)? Considering how some measure of distinction 
between emergent and basal objects seems to be the crux of the concept of 
emergence, this question is the most pressing. 
 
(Q2) What sort of things are emergent? Emergence may not be limited only to 
entities, structures, and properties but patterns, processes, and laws may also 
be considered emergent. Emergence in any one of these categories may entail 
emergence in another. 
 
(Q3) Is emergence an objective feature of our world? It may well be that 
emergence is an objective feature of our world that applies to nature itself—
i.e. emergence is an ontological concept that applies to objects that see 
genuine autonomy from basal objects. On this reading, the sloping and 
rippling effect of sand dunes are actual properties that somehow see 
                                                             
16 These questions have been taken and refined from ibid., pp. 3-6. There are also elements of 
these in the likes of Jaegwon Kim, “Making Sense of Emergence”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 
95, No. 1 (1999), reprinted in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and 




ontological autonomy from the physical location and orientation of grains of 
sand.17 Or perhaps the converse might be true: that emergence applies only at 
the layer of understanding and is the result of our epistemological limitations; 
we only think of sand dunes and some of their properties as emergent because 
we lack the ability to compute the interactions between a trillion granular 
particles. Emergence would then be no more than a metaphor that we crudely 
use to comprehend the macroscopic patterns that sometimes result from 
dispersed interactions—a metaphor that is merely in the eye of the beholder. 
Whether emergence is ontological or epistemological is of significant 
importance as gut reactions to either position are potentially negative: it might 
be said that epistemological emergence makes emergence a trivial notion—the 
study of emergence would just be the study of our epistemological limitations 
and our heuristic short-hands—while ontological emergence makes emergence 
a wacky notion—it seems to read too much into the usage of terms like ‘levels 
of phenomena’ and postulates highly dubious ‘higher level’ objects. Any 
successful account of either forms of emergence needs to address these 
concerns. 
 
(Q4) Is emergence synchronic or diachronic? This is a contrast between 
emergence where the emergent object is synchronically present (i.e. present at 
the same time) with the basal object(s) from which it emerges and emergence 
where the base precedes the emergent object which develops diachronically 
(i.e. over time) from the former. An example of synchronic emergence may be 
                                                             
17 It should be clarified that ontological autonomy does not mean complete ontological 
independence. Of course emergent objects are never really ontologically independent from 
their bases—they after all emerge from them. The real-world manifestations of any such 




consciousness where the a particular emotion is synchronically present with 
whatever brain state it emerges from while a candidate for diachronic 
emergence may be flocking behaviour where the shape of the bird flock 
develops over time as more birds take flight and reach a certain altitude. Of 
course these examples may be insisted to be one way or another depending on 
whether one endorses a synchronic or a diachronic account of emergence. 
 
(Q5) Is emergence a classification concept or a continuum concept? Is the 
definition of emergence one that admits of clear binary classifications or is it 
one that occupies a continuum? In other words, do we say that an object is 
either emergent or not or do we use terms like ‘more emergent’ and ‘less 
emergent’ to describe it? 
 
(Q6) What exactly is the nature of the definition and account of emergence? 
This prima facie may seem to be a mere rehash of the questions posed before. 
In fact, it represents two issues that need to be addressed. Firstly, might there 
be more than one type of emergence such that a unified account of emergence 
is unattainable? This certainly seems like a plausible question to ask given the 
numerous cases that are branded as emergent. The fact that there are multiple 
irreconcilable accounts of emergence might even be indicative of this. 
Secondly, should an account of emergence be reflective of usage of the term 
or should emergence be defined only with philosophical soundness and rigour 
in mind (even if this results in an account of emergence that has no realisers). 
Settling this issue has two effects: it sets the rules of legitimacy by which any 
account of emergence that is to be considered to be of philosophical merit 
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must abide by, and it sets the scope of emergent objects we find (i.e. true 
emergence may be commonplace or rare or non-existent). 
 
At this juncture, were our focus purely on emergence itself, what 
would follow would be a taxonomy of the myriad accounts of emergence. But 
our focus is not on emergence itself but on how emergence relates to social 
scientific realism and the social sciences. 
 
 
3.2 Emergence & Social Scientific Realism 
 
 
What sort of emergence then are we talking about in our earlier 
definition of social scientific realism? Answering this question is crucial 
because the specifics of the sort of emergence we are interested in may 
determine (by contributing to the criteria that need to be met) the truth of 
social scientific realism. One way one might go about answering this question 
is by looking at examples of emergence in the social sciences. This seems to 
be an appealing approach to take since after all some of the paradigm 
examples of emergence are touted to be found in the social sciences: culture 
and most sociological objects are said to occupy another emergent ‘level’ of 
phenomena while consciousness—that our mental states are brought about by 
the mere interaction of cellular chemistry and electrical impulses—is perhaps 
considered the ultimate exemplar of emergence. This is of course an unhelpful 
approach to take and is so on two counts. 
To begin with, the approach assumes that there is emergence in the 
first place in the social sciences. Considering that one of the core theses of 
social scientific realism is that social scientific objects have an emergent 
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existence and that we have yet to ascertain whether we should endorse the 
position, the approach would be jumping the gun. Furthermore, the approach 
gets the chronology of the process wrong. Looking first at purported examples 
of emergence in the social sciences may yield an account of emergence that 
may have nothing to do with the issues and concerns that gave rise to our 
discussion of social scientific realism in the first place. In other words, our 
account of emergence should allay the fears and concerns that may cause some 
to endorse social scientific realism’s anti-thesis. 
 
3.2.1 Criteria for an account of emergence in social scientific realism 
 
To that end, it may be prudent to reiterate the major themes of social 
scientific realism. Recall that they are as follows.18 
(SST1) Convergence: The pictures of the emergent reality that 
social scientific theories paint and successively alter are 
converging, with increasingly greater degrees of accuracy, 
toward how this reality actually is. Crudely, the social sciences 
are ‘getting closer to the truth’. 
 
(SST2) Mind-Dependence: The counterfactual “if humans did 
not exist or engaged in discovery of and about the world 
differently, then the emergent entities and structures that are 
reported by the social sciences would still exist and in their 
current form” is false. This is false not only because of the 
obvious fact that social scientific objects would not exist 
without us, but also because of how our study of social 
scientific phenomena can change the phenomena in question. 
 
(SST3) Objectivity: Work in the social sciences constitutes 
attempts to discover objective emergent facts about the world. 
Though emergent social scientific entities and structures are 
mind-dependent, the theories that invoke them are taken to be 
objective fact and not merely a matter of perspective. 
 
(SST4) Emergence: The objects of inquiry in the social 
sciences are distinct from the sum total of their physical 
phenomena parts. These objects are thus emergent objects that 
cannot be studied by looking at mere physical phenomena. 
                                                             
18 From pp. 25 & 26. 
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Recall also that these themes are meant to provide for the following two 
appeals of social scientific realism.19 
(SSA1) Knowledge claims: The social sciences are like the 
physical sciences in that they similarly make contributions to 
the total pool of human knowledge. 
 
(SSA2) Claims of progression: The social sciences, like the 
physical sciences, make increasing contributions to the pool of 
human knowledge. 
 
Consequently any account of emergence that we settle on here must not only 
fulfil SST1 through SST3 (SST4 is omitted since it is the claim of emergence 
itself) but do so in a way that allows for SSA1 and SSA2. How then do we go 
about determining which account of emergence fulfils these criteria? After all 
there are too many accounts of emergence to sieve through. This is where our 
previously identified pressing questions of emergence prove helpful. 
 
3.2.2 Settling on an account of emergence 
 
The most efficient way of determining which account of emergence is 
to be used in social scientific realism then is to find answers to Q1 through Q6 
that gel with the themes and appeals of the view stated above. 20 
 
(A1) What is the exact nature of the autonomy possessed by emergent objects 
over and above the things from which they emerge? While insisting that the 
autonomy of social scientific objects over those found in the physical sciences 
is given by their irreducibility to them is perfectly consistent with SST1 
through SST3, this, as alluded to earlier in II, is not something that any 
sensible person would agree with—it is hard to deny that the state of the 
economy is in some sense reducible to the physical movements and activities 
                                                             
19 From p. 23. 
20 From pp. 33-36. 
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of individual homo sapiens. The autonomy is then in fact a conceptual one: 
social scientific objects are conceptually irreducible to objects found in the 
physical sciences in that something would be lost explanatorily in any attempt 
at a full translation. In this sense, there is an inexplicability of social scientific 
phenomena from basal physical phenomena (i.e. an explanans consisting of 
only information about basal physical phenomena can never be considered 
adequately instructive for understanding the emergent social scientific 
explanandum). Jerry Fodor himself communicates this idea pointedly in his 
example of the “immortal econophysicist”21 who attempts to derive economic 
principles from an understanding of physics and who mistakes ‘co-
extensiveness’ with ‘reducibility’.22 23 (Note that a conceptual autonomy does 
not prioritise an ontological over an epistemological autonomy or vice versa. 
Something could be conceptually irreducible because of either epistemological 
limitations or ontological differences.) 
 
(A2) What sort of things are emergent? What sorts of things are emergent has 
no bearing on SST1 through SST3 and hence our account of emergence for the 
purposes of social scientific realism can remain neutral on this issue. 
Consequently, our account of emergence can allow for entities, structures, 
properties, patterns, processes, and laws to all be potentially considered 
emergent. 
 
                                                             
21 A frightening unexciting portmanteau of a profession. 
22 See Jerry Fodor, “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis)”, Synthese, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1974), reprinted in Emergence: Contemporary 
Readings in Philosophy and Science, edited by Bedau & Humphreys, op. cit., pp. 395-409. 
23 The notion that objects can be emergent from but remain in some sense reducible to their 
base is not new. See William C. Wimsatt, “Aggregativitiy: Reductive Heuristics for Finding 
Emergence”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, No. 2, Supplement 2 (1997), reprinted in 
Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science, edited by Bedau & 
Humphreys, op. cit., pp. 99-110. 
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(A3) Is emergence an objective feature of our world? As per SST3 (that the 
social sciences are objective), the account of emergence that we eventually 
settle on has to take emergence as an objective feature of our world that 
applies to nature itself. Our account would then be one of ontological 
emergence where emergent objects enjoy genuine ontological autonomy from 
their constituent parts.24 Emergence would then be delineated by a certain sort 
of novelty that is not merely temporal—there would be ontologically new 
entities and ontologically new properties and laws that govern them. It should 
be noted that epistemological emergence would not satisfy SST3. On an 
epistemological account of emergence, whether something is considered 
emergent is contingent on epistemological limitations which in turn may vary 
across individuals, groups, or time. Crudely, emergence would be dependent 
on how sharp the metaphorical eyes are of our beholder. Even if it turns out 
that there are certain in principle human epistemic limitations that prevent the 
computation of certain phenomena from their basal components and that it is 
these eternally insurmountable limitations that epistemic emergentists use to 
define the concept, SST3 would still not be satisfied. This variant of epistemic 
emergence would still be relative to one’s epistemic limitation (even though 
all humans may share them). (Other ways to think about this is with regard to 
aliens or in a ‘possible worlds’ sense. The in-principle epistemic limitations 
that apply to humans may not apply to Klingons or even to humans in some 
other possible world. Epistemic emergence would still be relative.) 
 
(A4) Is emergence synchronic or diachronic? While nothing about SST1 
through SST3 implies that the account of emergence we eventually settle on 
                                                             
24 See pp. 9 & 10. See also footnote 7. 
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must be synchronic or diachronic, diachronic emergentist accounts are saddled 
with some problems specific to certain social scientific fields that make these 
accounts less likely to be applicable for our purposes. Significantly, it is 
dubious whether any account of diachronic emergence can adequately make 
sense of consciousness and mental states—it seems difficult to conceive that a 
particular mental state or emotion is not synchronically co-extensive with the 
neural state that gives rise to it.25 
 
(A5) Is emergence a classification concept or a continuum concept? For 
emergence together with SST3 (that the social sciences are objective) to allow 
for SSA1 (that social scientific claims are knowledge claims that add to the 
total pool of human knowledge), emergence has to be a classification concept. 
Even if emergence is fundamentally a continuum concept, it will evolve into a 
classification concept for our purposes. If emergence is a continuum concept, 
then social scientific objects would not be emergent or non-emergent but more 
emergent or less emergent. If so, then for social scientific claims about social 
scientific objects to add anything beyond standard scientific claims about 
                                                             
25 The main accounts of diachronic ontological emergence both suffer from this issue. 
Dynamical accounts spearheaded by the likes of Timothy O’Connor argue that an emergent 
object at time t is the result of both its base at time t and other emergent objects at time t-1. 
This allows identical basal states to yield different emergent ones depending on prior 
emergent states. This is incredibly dubious especially when applied to the mind—to think that 
the same neural state can be co-extensive with different mental states is not something that is 
widely accepted. The other diachronic account endorsed (to my knowledge) solely by Paul 
Humphreys, crudely, puts forth that the constituent objects of an emergent one in some sense 
cease to be once there is emergence. So two coins fused together laterally become a new 
system and the emergent probability of that system landing a certain way when flipped is not 
equal merely to some interaction of the probabilities of the individual coins landing one side 
up—they (the coins) and their individual probabilities cease to exist. Humphrey’s account sees 
some potential applicability at the quantum level but seems to completely miss the mark were 
it used in the social sciences. The emergence of a mental state does not seem to render talk of 
individual neurons mistaken. Though to be fair, Humphreys never intended his account to 
apply to the social sciences. See Timothy O’Connor & Hong Yu Wong, “The Metaphysics of 
Emergence”, Noûs, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2005), pp. 658-678; and Paul Humphreys, “How 
Properties Emerge”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, No. 1 (1997), reprinted in Emergence: 




these objects, there must be some sort of threshold of emergence beyond 
which an object is to be considered as novel. Our interest would then be in 
whether there is social scientific objects fall beyond this threshold—the 
concept of emergence would effectively function as a classification one. 
 
(A6) What exactly is the nature of the definition and account of emergence? 
This question is largely irrelevant to what account of emergence we finally 
settle on though it provides an opportunity for us to reinforce why our 
responses to previous questions were so and why our eventual choice of 
account of emergence will be largely immune to criticism. To begin with, it 
does not matter for our purposes whether there is more than one type of 
emergence. All that matters is that our account of emergence be applicable to 
purported emergence in the social sciences. If it turns out that there are many 
types of emergence even within the social sciences, the account must be 
sufficiently broad to explain all of them. Cautiously, this is not the same as the 
account having to explain all purported instances of emergence in the social 
sciences. Some of these purported instances of emergence may not be proper 
instances of emergence at all. There may be several reasons for this. One such 
reason is that just as there are pseudo-scientific theories that erroneously 
postulate certain entities or properties there may be pseudo-social-scientific 
theories that do the same. These pseudo-social-scientific entities or properties 
may fail tests of emergence that our eventual settled account may set out, and 
do so through no fault of our account—they were never really proper objects 
of social scientific inquiry to begin with. This brings us to our second point: 
our account of emergence need not be reflective of the (myriad) existing 
(sometimes nuanced) usages of the term. It need only conform to the major 
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themes and appeals of social scientific realism set out before. In instances 
where these had no direct bearing on what answer should be given to the 
questions asked above, a choice was made that would allow for the most 
plausible and coherent account of social scientific realism. 
 
Consequently, we see that the account of emergence that we settle on 
would involve a conceptual irreducibility to basal objects, allow multiple sorts 
of objects to be considered emergent, entail the ontological autonomy and 
existence of emergent objects, be synchronic in character, and employ 
emergence as a classification concept. To my knowledge only one view of 
emergence satisfies these conditions: ontological supervenience emergence. 
The view itself has a handful of variants but all of them seem to be committed 
to the idea that emergent objects are objects that supervene on its constituent 
parts. Some clarification is in order. Supervenience is a relation that is weaker 
than reduction and is usually best encapsulated by the slogan “ if A supervenes 
on B, then there cannot be a difference in A without a difference in B”. (Note 
that this slogan does not imply that if there is a difference in B there must be a 
difference in A—though this erroneous conception of supervenience will have 
a part to play in our characterisation of emergence as we shall soon see.) 
While the relation is usually spelled out in terms of properties (i.e. there 
cannot be a difference in A-properties without a difference in B-properties), 
supervenience may potentially also apply to laws, entities, structures, et cetera. 
Consider now the following as an instructive example of ontological 
supervenience emergence: take for example Schubert’s Ellens dritter Gesang 
(sometimes more familiarly known as Ave Maria). The aria’s sound structure 
is realisable in many different forms—CDs, a grand piano, the bits and bytes 
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of digital music, et cetera. The aria is also realisable in different ways 
depending on the arrangement—a choral hymn, a soprano with only a piano 
accompaniment, et cetera. Yet the aria itself is not in any way reducible to any 
one of these—it is in some sense autonomous. We say that this piece of music 
is multiply realisable and supervenes on the pit-patterns of a CD, or the bits 
and bytes of a digital file, et cetera—these are what give rise to its actual aural 
manifestations but never do we say that the aria is the pit-patterns of a CD or 
the bits and bytes of a digital file. Note that this multiple-realisability means 
that the aria as an emergent object can stay the same despite changes to its 
base—i.e. it is not the case that there cannot be a change in the base without 
there being a change to the aria. Now equipped with a better understanding of 
ontological supervenience emergence, we can formally articulate the concept. 
General Ontological Supervenience Emergence: For any two 
objects A and B, if and only if a supervenience relation holds 
between them such that there cannot be a difference in A 
without a corresponding difference in B and it is not the case 
that there cannot be a difference in B without a corresponding 
difference in A, then A is ontologically superveniently 
emergent from B. 
 
This is a very general characterisation of ontological supervenience emergence 
but it will suffice for our purposes as we see that it appears to satisfy all the 
conditions that our account of emergence must meet.26 Because a 
supervenience relation is invoked, it allows for emergent objects to be 
conceptually irreducible to their base (just as Ave Maria is irreducible to a 
particular sound structure in a particular medium). Moreover, that 
                                                             
26 More detailed accounts abound. Brian McLaughlin, for example, insists that this 
supervenience is of nomological—and not logical—necessity and seems to restrict 
applicability to only properties and laws. See Brian McLaughlin, “Emergence and 
Supervenience”, Intellectica, No. 25 (1997), reprinted in Emergence: Contemporary Readings 
in Philosophy and Science, edited by Bedau & Humphreys, op. cit., pp. 81-97. See also James 
Van Cleeve, “Mind—Dust or Magic? Panpsychism versus Emergence”, Philosophical 
Perspectives, Vol. 4 (1990), pp. 215-226; and Timothy O’Connor, “Emergent Properties”, 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1994), pp. 91-104. 
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supervenience is potentially applicable to more than just properties allows for 
multiple sorts of objects to be considered emergent. In addition, the 
supervenient existence which the account states that emergent objects possess 
grants a degree of ontological autonomy from basal objects. Also, the account 
permits synchronic emergence. (It may in fact permit only synchronic 
emergence.) Lastly, since supervenience is a classification concept—
something either supervenes on something else or it does not—so too is 
emergence on the account. This account of emergence seems to be the one that 
best suits our definition of social scientific realism. 
 
3.2.3 Dealing with refutations  
 
However, the account is not without its detractors. Jaegwon Kim for 
one argues that ontological supervenience emergence reeks of 
epiphenomenalism. His argument consists of two parts. Hong Yu Wong in his 
discussion of Kim’s argument summarises the first part best.27 
“Consider a[n emergent] property M1, at non-fundamental level L 
and time t1, that causes another property M2, at non-fundamental 
level L and time t2. Since M2 is a property at a non-fundamental 
level, by hypothesis, it has emergence base, P2, at t2 and level L-1. 
Kim sees a tension in this situation because there appear to be two 
answers to why M2 is instantiated at t2. First, M2 is instantiated at t2 
because M1 at t1 caused it (ex hypothesi); second, M2 must of (at 
least) nomological necessity be instantiated at t2 because its 
emergence base, P2, is present. Kim claims that there appear to be 
two competing causes for the instantiation of M2 at t2, and this 
apparently jeopardizes M1’s causal responsibility for M2.”28 
 
Kim argues using emergent properties though this is not necessary—his case 
could be just as easily made with emergent entities, or patterns, et cetera. 
Nevertheless, from this we can reconstruct the first part of Kim’s argument. 
                                                             
27 Here, Wong is quoted instead of Kim as Kim’s choice of nomenclature is extremely 
unintuitive. See Hong Yu Wong, “The Secret Lives of Emergents”, Emergence in Science and 
Philosophy, edited by Antonella Corradini & Timothy O’Connor (New York: Routledge, 
2010), pp. 7-24. For Kim’s original nomenclature, see Kim, op. cit., pp. 142 & 143. 
28 Quote from Wong, op. cit., p. 10. Author’s emphasis.  
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(A1) M1 causes M2. (Assumption) 
(A2) M2, being emergent, has base P2. (Concept of 
emergence) 
(A3) It is both the case that M1 causes M2 and that M2 is the 
result of P2. (A1 & A2) 
(A4) A3 is coherent only if M1 causes M2 via P2. 
(Assumption) 
(A5) M1 causes M2 via causing P2. (A3, A4, & coherence) 
 
As we can see, the first part of Kim’s argument seeks to establish what he calls 
the “principle of downward causation”, namely that 
 “[t]o cause any property (except those at the very bottom level) to be 
instantiated, you must cause the basal conditions from which it arises 
(either as an emergent or as a resultant).”29 
 
Kim thinks this principle of downward causation is crucial to making sense of 
one emergent object causing another. From this principle, Kim continues his 
argument. 
(A6) M1 is nomologically sufficient for P2. (A5: because M1 
causes P2). 
(A7) M1, being emergent, has its own base P1. (Concept of 
emergence) 
(A8) P1 is nomologically sufficient for M1. (A7) 
(A9) P1 is nomologically sufficient for P2. (A6, A8, & 
transitivity) 
(A10) P1 is a cause of P2. (A9) 
(A11) Emergence is a non-causal relation, i.e. an emergent 
object may be said to supervene on its base but not be 
caused by it. (Assumption) 
(A12) P1 cannot be the cause of P2 through M1 (because P1 as 
the base of M1 cannot be said to be the cause of M1). 
(A10 & A11) 
(A13) P1 is a sufficient cause for P2. (A10 & A12) 
(A14) M1 is not a cause of P2. (A13) 
(A15) M1 cannot cause M2 via causing P2. (A5 & A14; 
contradiction) 
(A16) M1 does not cause M2. (A1 & A15; contradiction) 
(A17) M1 is epiphenomenal. (A16) 30 
 
Here, Kim’s entire argument is complicated but the essence of it is as 
follows. An emergent object M1 can only cause another emergent object M2 
                                                             
29 Kim, op. cit., p. 143. 
30 This second part I refine and extend from Wong’s own reconstruction of Kim’s argument. 
See Wong, op. cit., p. 12. See also Kim, op. cit., p. 149. 
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by causing the latter’s base P2 as an intermediary cause. This means that M1 is 
nomologically sufficient for P2. But M1 has its own base P1 so that P1 is 
nomologically sufficient for M1. By transitivity, P1 could be said to be 
nomologically sufficient for P2 and so P1 now qualifies as a cause of P2. But P1 
cannot be said to cause P2 via causing M1 since the relation between M1 and 
its base P1 is non-causal—M1 emerges from and is not caused by P1. P1 would 
then be a sufficient cause of P2 meaning that M1 does not cause P2 after all. 
Yet if M1 does not cause P2, how does it cause P2’s emergent object M2? 
Kim’s answer is that it does not—M1 is epiphenomenal in the sense that it 
plays no causal role whatsoever. 
The charge of epiphenomenalism—in this case that emergent objects 
are caused by their physical bases but play no further causal role themselves—
may appear prima facie benign to our cause. Bear in mind that the point of our 
discussion on emergence is to specify the account of emergence that best fits 
with social scientific realism and an epiphenomenal emergent world of social 
scientific objects does not seem to violate any of the major themes or appeals 
of social scientific realism. After all, there is no real contradiction between 
social scientific objects occupying an objective emergent reality that we 
converge upon with progressively accurate knowledge claims and these 
emergent objects being epiphenomenal. Yet on closer inspection Kim’s charge 
is problematic for social scientific realists. While an epiphenomenal emergent 
world of social scientific objects does not negate all of the claims made in the 
social sciences, it certainly negates many of them. If social scientific objects 
are indeed emergent in some epiphenomenal manner, then many of the causal 
claims or claims about the interaction between such objects would be false—
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culture would have no effect on self-construal, stock markets would have no 
effect on the wider economy, and first-past-the-post voting systems would 
have no role to play in the creation a two-party political system. Again it may 
be prudent to address Kim’s concerns about the account we have settled on. 
What then can we say about Kim’s argument? There are a few 
problems with it that Wong identifies. For one thing, Wong thinks that Kim 
seems to assume the completeness of physics by deriving that P1 is a sufficient 
cause of P2 (premise A13) merely from the facts that it is a cause (premise 
A10) and that M1 is not an intermediary cause (premise A12). Furthermore, 
Wong thinks that it is perfectly possible for P1 and M1 to overdetermine P2 and 
that an emergentist who adopts this picture of emergent objects being 
overdetermined by its base and prior emergents is immune to Kim’s 
criticism.31 Nevertheless there is an easier way to dismiss Kim’s charge. 
Recall the first four premises of Kim’s argument. 
(A1) M1 causes M2. (Assumption) 
(A2) M2, being emergent, has base P2. (Concept of 
emergence) 
(A3) It is the both case that M1 causes M2 and that M2 is the 
result of P2. (A1 & A2) 
(A4) A3 is coherent only if M1 causes M2 via P2. 
(Assumption) 
 
A4 points out that having both M1 and P2 as being responsible for M2 is 
incoherent unless M1 causes M2 through P2. Yet why should we accept this—
i.e. why is it the case that having both M1 cause M2 and M2 be the result of P2 
lead to any incoherence at all? Kim himself thinks that the problem is that M1 
and P2 are in competition.32 Yet in what way are they in competition if one is a 
cause and one is an emergence base? Kim seems to be implicitly working with 
                                                             
31 Wong, op. cit., p. 13. 
32 Kim, op. cit., pp. 142 & 143. 
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the notion that they are competing causes. Recall, however, a later premise of 
his. 
(A11) Emergence is a non-causal relation, i.e. an emergent 
object may be said to supervene on its base but not 
caused by it. (Assumption) 
 
P2 cannot be said to be a cause of M2 since their relation is a non-causal one. 
But, as Wong himself puts it, “if P2 isn’t a cause of M2, how can it compete as 
a cause with M1?”33 Without P2 as a competing cause, we have no reason to 
accept the purported incoherence between M1’s and P2’s roles in giving rise to 
M2 and hence no reason to accept Kim’s suggestion of downward causation. 
So Kim faces a dilemma: either emergence is a non-causal relation, in which 
case Kim cannot legitimately derive his principle of downward causation and 
consequently cannot argue towards M1 being epiphenomenal, or emergence is 
a causal relation, in which case Kim gets to keep his principle of downward 
causation but still cannot argue M1 is epiphenomenal. In either case, social 
scientific realists get to plausibly hold and invoke supervenience emergence 
for their purposes. 
 
3.2.4 Social scientific objects as superveniently emergent 
 
 What does this all mean for our definition of social scientific realism? 
For one thing, we now have a better understanding of the crucial theme of 
social scientific realism SST4 (that social scientific objects are emergent)—
social scientific objects are distinct from the sum total of their physical 
phenomena parts and cannot be studied by merely looking at such phenomena 
because social scientific objects supervene on physical phenomena and are 
emergent from them. 
                                                             
33 Wong, op. cit., p. 11. 
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Another observation about social scientific realism stems from the 
relationship between supervenience and reductionism. Supervenience is silent 
on whether reductionism is true (in fact, supervenience is required for 
reductionism since if A reduces to B, there certainly cannot be a difference in 
A without a corresponding one in B). Interestingly enough, this actually bodes 
well for our definition of social scientific realism. As mentioned much earlier, 
it would be absurd to think that social scientific phenomena are not in some 
sense reducible to physical phenomena. No matter how autonomous a social 
scientific phenomenon from its constituent physical phenomena parts, the fact 
remains that precisely duplicating these parts with exactly the same relation to 
each other as before would yield the exact same social scientific phenomenon. 
This notion is preserved with social scientific realists’ use of supervenience 
while at the same time allowing for them to consistently hold the conceptual 







Our foregoing analysis of the concept of emergence has proven 
fruitful: through an articulation of the general features and the lines dividing 
the numerous accounts of the concept and in conjunction with what we know 
of social scientific realism in II, we have successfully identified the account of 
emergence that best fits the purposes of the social scientific realist—General 
Ontological Supervenience Emergence. It has also been argued that the 
primary criticism of the account fails to show that emergent objects are 
epiphenomenal (as Kim might claim). Consequently, we now know that social 
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scientific realism is committed to social scientific objects having an emergent 
existence that ontologically supervene on the objects of inquiry in the physical 
sciences and that it is this use of the notion of supervenience that increases the 
credibility of their position. With our understanding of social scientific realism 




IV: Social Scientific Kinds as Interactive Kinds & the 




We have thus far gained a clear and thorough comprehension of social 
scientific realism, though such comprehension alone does not answer the 
pressing question: “Should we endorse social scientific realism?” and it is this 
very question that this final substantive chapter attempts to answer. I will 
begin by probing the nature of social scientific objects, explaining that the best 
way to understand these is to think of them as kinds. Since philosophical 
discourse on kinds has centred primarily on natural kinds, I subsequently pay 
some attention to the notion of natural kinds by defining the notion, make 
some attempt to ascertain if social scientific kinds are natural kinds, and 
eventually argue that considering whether social scientific kinds are natural 
kinds is unhelpful by articulating commonly suggested criteria for natural-
kind-hood and showing that meeting them has no bearing on one’s stand on 
social scientific realism. Another way of thinking about kinds will then be 
introduced—Ian Hacking’s notion of interactive kinds. I provide an exposition 
of the notion of interactive kinds, articulating and refining the characteristics 
of such kinds before arguing that interactive kinds are social scientific kinds. 
This chapter concludes with an argument utilising what we know of 
emergence and social scientific objects as interactive kinds that, to my mind, 









4.1 Social Scientific Kinds 
 
 
What exactly is the nature of entities/structures invoked in the social 
sciences and what can we say about them that would aid in determining the 
truth of social scientific realism? For one thing, we know that they are kinds. 
While philosophical discourse on kinds has usually revolved around natural 
kinds (something we shall get to in due course), we often forget that the notion 
of kind itself, based on our usage of the word, is a very loose and minimal one. 
We say that dhal is a kind of curry, conditioner a kind of hair product, and 
peanut a kind of legume. We also speak of kinds that either no longer exist or 
have never existed—we say that triceratops is a kind of dinosaur that lived in 
the late Cretaceous, that dragons are a kind of creature, and that wands are a 
kind of magical implement. Our usage of the word seems to indicate that a 
kind is a class of entities and/or structures (extant or otherwise) that show 
some degree of property similarity—different servings of dhal curry are united 
into a kind by their shared usage of pulses in the same way different wands 
across different fictional universes are united into a kind by them all being 
short sticks that allow its users to cast spells.34 
                                                             
34 Here it might be thought that I am adopting Quine’s notion that kinds are sets. Though I 
agree with him, I do not wish to adopt his understanding of kinds in this thesis as his view is 
potentially contentious. This has primarily to do with the ontological status of kinds that have 
no members—i.e. on Quine’s reading empty sets. The kind ‘dragon’ if thought of as a set 
would be an empty one. Does the kind ‘dragon’ then exist? That would depend on what one’s 
view is on the ontic status of empty sets. I am of the opinion that sets without members exist 
and that our talk about kinds like ‘dragon’ and ‘leprechaun’ lend credence to this view—
dragons do not exist though ‘dragon’ as kind certainly does. The problem however is that the 
ontological status of empty sets is questionable. This leads to a number of views on the matter: 
one could accept Quine’s view and deny that empty sets and memberless kinds exist, or accept 
Quine’s view and assert that empty sets and memberless kinds exist, or assert that memberless 
kinds exist but that empty sets do not and hence deny Quine’s view that kinds are sets. 
Working with a much more minimal Quinean understanding of kind as cashed out above 
allows us to sidestep the contention entirely. See W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and 
Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). 
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How is any of this helpful? Well, scientists studying physical 
phenomena do not study particular phenomena or conduct particular 
experiments with a view to learning merely about said particular phenomenon 
but do so to learn about the kind of which that particular phenomenon is a 
member. The same is true of social scientists. Just as H2O, prokaryotes, and 
electromagnetic waves are considered by physical scientists to be kinds of 
physical phenomena, markets, general anxiety disorder, and anomie are 
considered to be kinds of social phenomena (henceforth ‘social scientific 
kinds’).35 The object of social scientific inquiry is general anxiety disorder as 
kind and not a single jittery individual in the same way the object of scientific 
inquiry is H2O as kind and not a particular beaker of the substance. (For this 
reason I will henceforth use ‘social scientific kind’ and ‘social scientific 
object’ interchangeably.) As with dhal curry and wands, kind-membership 
here is delineated by property commonality: particular social scientific 
phenomena that have some properties in common are considered as a (or as 
belonging to) a kind of social scientific phenomena in much the same way 
particular physical phenomena that share some properties are considered as a 
(or as belonging to) a kind of physical phenomena. 
Thinking of the objects of social scientific inquiry as kinds of course 
hardly settles the truth of social scientific realism—after all in the physical 
sciences to acknowledge that ‘electron’ is a kind is not to acknowledge that 
electrons actually exist and that scientific realism is the way to go. 
Furthermore, as mentioned before, ‘kindhood’ is a very minimal concept: 
‘mud’ and ‘toothpaste’ are both kinds though to say so is to say something 
                                                             
35 It must be acknowledged that a kind of the former may be the partial realiser of that of the 
latter as may be the case in psychology. 
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very uninteresting. Indeed much more must be said if this talk of kinds is to be 
useful to our project. What makes social scientific kinds different from kinds 
like ‘toothpaste’? Crudely, what ‘kind of kinds’ are social scientific kinds? 
 
 
4.2 Natural Kinds 
 
 
While there may be many ways kinds can be divided up and a 
correspondingly many ‘kinds of kinds’ (mystical kinds, supernatural kinds, et 
cetera), the ‘kind of kinds’ that appears to have seen greatest philosophical 
interest is natural kinds. A natural kind is a kind whose member particulars do 
not owe its kind-hood to us—i.e. the grouping of such particulars into a kind 
indicate orderings by nature and not just by us. Indeed, it is famously said that 
natural kinds ‘carve nature at the joints’.36 37 
 
4.2.1 Social scientific kinds & natural kindhood 
 
Are social scientific kinds then natural kinds? Do kinds such as ‘major 
depressive disorder (MDD) sufferer’ constitute a natural grouping of particular 
phenomena the demarcation of which ‘carves nature at its joints’ 
independently of us? What does the metaphor even mean exactly, especially 
with regard to social scientific kinds? After all the objects of inquiry in the 
                                                             
36 The phrase, made famous in Plato’s discussion of universals in the Phaedrus, is now the 
standard motto for discussions about natural kinds. See Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, 
& Matthew Slater, Carving Nature at Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011). 
37 Here it is wise to point out that the notion of natural kinds is not to be confused with that of 
natural kind-concepts or natural kind-terms. Discourse about the former is primarily interested 
in the metaphysics of natural kinds while that about the latter concerns itself with the 
semantics and reference relations of terms used to label natural kinds. Moving forward, any 
further discussion on the matter will surround natural kinds and not kind-concepts/kind-terms 
since our examination of any ‘kind of kinds’ is conducted with a view to shedding some light 
on the ontological nature of social scientific kinds for the purposes of ascertaining the truth of 




social sciences definitely depend on humans—there would be neither MDD 
sufferers nor psychologists to group them up without humans. Does that mean 
that social scientific kinds are necessarily by definition not natural kinds? 
Only if one’s definition is naive. Most philosophical discussions about natural 
kinds have focused on the physical sciences so it is only understandable that 
the notion has been defined in terms of human mind-independence. Questions 
such as “Would there still be a grouping/kind X, where X is a kind found in 
the sciences, were humans not in the picture?” might be useful as crude tests 
of natural kindhood with respect to the physical sciences but would yield 
misleading conclusions with respect to the social sciences. Whether certain 
kinds are natural kinds is not an issue of whether kind-phenomena are 
independent of humans but whether such kind-groupings are human mind-
independent—though it is easy to confuse the former with the latter. A better 
question for the social sciences might then be “Would there still be a 
grouping/kind X, where X is a kind found in the social sciences, were the 
Klingons the one to study/group/classify human social behaviour?”. This 
question, as far-fetched a scenario it asks us to imagine, actually grounds our 
understanding of the notion of natural kindhood—not just with respect to the 
social sciences but simpliciter—on much firmer soil. Kindhood in general is 
strictly the concern of beings with the desire to organise their phenomenal 
experiences and to speak of kindhood, natural or otherwise, in the absence of 
humans or any other such beings is, to my mind, a philosophical mistake.  
Whether a certain kind is a natural kind is really a question of whether the 
organisation of particular phenomena into such a kind followed a ‘natural 
way’ of doing so (‘correctly’ identifying nature’s joints) such that the kind-
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phenomena would be organised similarly regardless of who (or what) is doing 
the organisation. 
Returning to our original question, we once again ask: are social 
scientific kinds then natural kinds? This remains a difficult question to answer. 
Debate continues as to whether garden-variety scientific kinds (i.e. the kinds 
that the physical sciences postulate and study) are truly natural kinds or 
merely a product of conventionalism38—the natural kindhood status of social 
scientific kinds, with its perhaps greater susceptibility to experimenter bias 
and cultural influence, seems just as debatable if not more so. Are we at an 
impasse? 
 
4.2.2 The irrelevance of natural kindhood to emergence 
 
Here it is important to bear in mind that our on-going discussion on 
natural kinds has thus far been driven by two factors: that we need to know 
more about what ‘kind of kinds’ are social scientific kinds and that the most 
glaring ‘kind of kinds’ in philosophical literature has been that of natural 
kinds. Yet should it be that the case that the natural kindhood status of social 
scientific kinds is irrelevant to the truth of social scientific realism, then it 
would be prudent to ignore the topic of natural kinds in this project (no matter 
how important the topic is in others). 
As it turns out, the answer to the question of whether social scientific 
kinds are natural kinds is irrelevant for our purposes. How so? It appears that 
the commonly cited criteria for natural kindhood/characteristics of natural 
kinds have no bearing on the truth of social scientific realism, i.e. they are 
                                                             
38 Discussions on the natural kindhood of kinds in the physical sciences have had a long 
history. See J. S. Mill, A System of Logic Vol. II (London: Longman, 1884), pp. 212-234; 
Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978); and André Kukla, 
Social Construction and the Philosophy of Science (London: Routledge, 2000). 
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neither singularly necessary nor jointly sufficient for social scientific kinds to 
have an emergent existence. I must acknowledge that it might appear to some 
that our hands are tied somewhat in showing this. After all, to best prove, for 
example, that a condition is not necessary for social scientific kinds to have an 
emergent existence is to produce a social scientific kind that fails said 
condition and still has an emergent existence nonetheless. Obviously, this is 
something we cannot do at the moment—what is at stake is precisely whether 
social scientific realism is true and hence whether social scientific kinds have 
an emergent existence beyond the kinds found in the physical science. 
Producing an example of a social scientific kind that we assert is emergently 
extant would amount to mere table-thumping. So how will we prove our bold 
claim that the conditions for natural kindhood are neither necessary nor 
sufficient for social scientific kinds to have an emergent existence? By 
focusing on emergence itself: since our interest lies not in showing how social 
scientific kinds might exist (our discussion in II showed that there are ways 
one can affirm or deny this depending on what one means by ‘exist’) but how 
they might exist in an emergent fashion, our consideration of natural kindhood 
conditions shall concern itself with whether these conditions are necessary or 
sufficient for emergence itself. As we shall see, these conditions are neither 
necessary nor sufficient for emergence regardless of the account of emergence 
endorsed. What follows is a discussion of two such often suggested criteria for 
natural kindhood and their relation, if any, to emergence.39 
 
                                                             
39 I take these mainly from Joseph Campbell, Michael O’Rourke, & Matthew Slater (editors), 




(NK1) The defining common properties of that kind must be natural ones. 
Though we are not here to judge whether the natural kindhood conditions 
commonly postulated by philosophers are correct, this condition at least makes 
prima facie sense: a natural kind ‘cleaves at nature’s joints’ precisely because 
it is delineated by natural properties. Of course what ‘natural properties’ are is 
up for grabs. David Lewis proposes three readings.40 
Natural properties as essential properties: Here a natural property is 
understood as being an essential one, i.e. one the removal of which 
from an object would create a different object altogether. For example, 
while Bill Gates is in fact a billionaire industrialist and philanthropist, 
he might not have been; he could have chosen a different career and 
still have been the same person. Gates is also human—a property that 
it is much less apparent that he would be the same person (or perhaps a 
person at all) without. Being human would then be an essential 
property of being Bill Gates while being a billionaire industrialist and 
philanthropist would be an accidental property of the Bill Gates we 
know. Is it then the case that a kind’s defining properties must 
necessarily be essential ones for it to exhibit emergence? No. Our Bill 
Gates example might be used as proof this—Gates as the man we in 
fact know today seems defined by his billionaire industrialist 
beginnings and current philanthropist efforts even though these 
properties of his are indeed accidental. But to press this example is to 
insist that persons such as Bill Gates show emergence and it is unclear 
at this point that persons, a social scientific kind, are emergent. 
                                                             
40 David Lewis, “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 
Vol. 61 (1983), pp. 343-377. 
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Furthermore ‘Bill Gates’ does not sound like a kind (though it might 
be—just with a membership of one). Perhaps a less contentious 
example is in order: ecosystems as emergent systems are a kind that is 
defined by their numerous food web relationships and climatic 
conditions—all of which are certainly accidental properties of that 
given ecosystem. For example, two of the standout features of the 
sawgrass marsh ecosystem in the Floridan everglades are the presence 
of periphyton and alligator nests—organisms that certainly could have 
failed to be present. It just is not the case that an emergent system must 
have as its defining properties essential ones. 
Natural properties as non-relational properties: Here a natural property 
is understood as being a non-relational one, i.e. one that is not 
contingent on some relation being satisfied.41 For example, having a 
mass of ninety kilograms is a non-relational property whilst having a 
weight of approximately nine hundred newtons is a relational one—in 
this case the relationship being satisfied is that that person is on 
Earth.42 Is it then the case that a kind’s defining properties must 
necessarily be non-relational ones for it to exhibit emergence? No. 
Here one of the paradigmatic examples of emergence in the biological 
sciences comes to mind: flocking behaviour is considered to be a 
                                                             
41 I am aware that essential properties tend to be non-relational and that this overlap may lead 
some to think that essential and non-relational properties are the same thing. This is of course 
mistaken: there are relational properties that are also essential. Essential to the concept of 
being married is that some relation holds—in this case namely the relation of being married to 
some particular individual. 
42 Because mass and weight are also the paradigm examples of intrinsic and extrinsic 
properties, some might think that the notion of non-relational versus relational properties is 
really just that of intrinsic versus extrinsic ones. This conflation, just like the one in the 
previous footnote, is mistaken. Most people have the property of their left limbs and organs 
being slightly longer and larger than their right ones. This property seems intrinsic even 
though it is contingent on some relation being satisfied. 
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showing of emergence even though the phenomenon is defined 
primarily in terms of the behavioural and spatial relations between 
birds. 
Natural properties as ‘primitively natural’: On this reading, natural 
properties are to be understood as being ‘primitively natural’, i.e. 
properties that are just natural without further explanation. We just so 
happen to mostly make correct identifications of what such properties 
are through perhaps some sort of trained common sense. Lewis himself 
does not offer a list of natural properties on this reading. Is it then the 
case that a kind’s defining properties must necessarily be ‘primitively 
natural’ ones for it to exhibit emergence? Frankly it is hard to say. This 
reading of ‘natural properties’ fails to identify any characteristic 
common to such properties but instead in effect proposes that ‘natural 
properties’ merely constitute a laundry list of properties that we 
somehow have regimented our common sense to identify them as such. 
Thankfully, this is precisely what allows us to dismiss ‘natural 
properties’ on this reading as nonetheless irrelevant to emergence. 
Suppose that natural properties are in fact a mere laundry list of 
properties. Even if it is discovered that all emergent systems that we 
know of have defining properties that draw from this list, it is difficult 
for anyone to conclusively assert that such properties are necessary for 
emergence. After all, how exactly would they be necessary? Without 
being able to show any identifiable characteristic that binds these 
properties together, it would be hard to say. Individuals who insist that 
the overlap between emergent systems and these properties is evidence 
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of necessity might be harping on a contingent fact: it may well be that 
there are emergent systems that do not have defining properties that 
draw from the list—we just have not discovered them yet. With so 
much uncertainty that follows from thinking of natural properties as 
‘primitively natural’ I believe it remains open to us to plausibly say 
that it just is not the case that an emergent system must have as its 
defining properties ‘primitively natural’ ones. 
 
(NK2) The kind should permit inductive inferences. This condition emerged 
against the background that is Nelson Goodman’s ‘Grue problem’. Goodman 
postulated a kind of emerald—Grue emeralds—that are either green and 
observed before time t (where t is some date in the distant future) or blue and 
not observed before t. Condition NK2 would rule out grue emeralds as being a 
natural kind: while every emerald that we observe that is green inductively 
confirms that future emeralds will be green, the same observation that every 
emerald seen thus far is grue does not inductively confirm that future emeralds 
will be grue.43 Of course the issue we are concerned with is whether the 
permission of inductive inferences is necessary for a kind to be emergent. 
Here it gets tricky. There is a reason why the physical sciences acknowledge 
and study emergent systems in general—it is an admission of the (sometimes 
immense) difficulty in inductively predicting such systems and an attempt to 
do so regardless. This raises an issue that needs to be settled before it can be 
ascertained if NK2 is necessary for emergence: what sort of permission of 
inductive inferences is NK2 interested in? Does the condition mean that the 
                                                             
43 See Quine, op. cit. See also Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 4th edition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983, originally published 1955). 
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kind allows for inductive inferences now and perhaps with its inferer in a 
condition of some uncertainty, or does it mean that the kind allows for 
inductive inferences in principle with its inferer in a condition of full 
synchronic information? Settling this matter is crucial if we are to determine if 
the condition is necessary for emergence since, as alluded to earlier, much of 
the work done with some emergent systems is done against a background of 
less-than-full information about the system. The paradigmatic example of this 
is weather forecasting. While short-term weather prediction is relatively 
accurate, any atmospheric predictions made beyond two weeks are highly 
erroneous—very minute errors in the variables measured (even those that 
result from instrument limitations) grow exponentially in any mathematical 
model used for prediction.44 Someone with full information about current 
wind speeds, temperatures, et cetera (to the nth decimal place) would be a 
much better weatherman. So is NK2 concerned with the permission of 
inductive inferences now or in principle? To my mind if it is to be a condition 
for natural kindhood, then it should be interested in the in-principle permission 
of inductive inferences. After all, should it be the case that a kind does not 
seem to permit inductive inferences now due to our limited understanding of it 
but does so later after much study, this reading of NK2 would grant that the 
kind was always a natural kind—as opposed to the absurd implication of the 
alternative reading that the kind became a natural kind after much study. 
Furthermore, that NK2 was raised against the backdrop of Goodman’s Grue 
problem is telling. Grue emeralds are not a natural kind because it would be 
impossible to say at just before t whether the next emerald observed would be 
                                                             
44 For more information on the vagaries of the weather and its prediction, see John D. Cox, 
 to m  atche s  the tu bu ent histo y o  weathe  p ediction   om   ank in’s kite to     i o 
(New Jersey: John Wiley, 2002). 
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blue and hence grue, regardless of how many green emeralds one has 
observed before—the non-projectibility of grue as a predicate makes it in 
principle impossible to know this. NK2 appears concerned with the in 
principle permission of inductive inferences. So then is the in principle 
permission of inductive inferences necessary for a kind to be an emergent one? 
This question is more difficult to answer than the ones concerning condition 
NK1 chiefly because it is difficult to think of an example of a real-world 
emergent system that fails to permit inductive inferences—the emergent kinds 
that we are sure of seem to allow for inductive inferences now, let alone in 
principle. So does this mean that NK2 is necessary for a kind to be emergent? 
No. Likely, all this means is that NK2 is necessary for an emergent kind to be 
a kind, i.e. it is the kindhood status of emergent kinds and not the emergent 
status of such kinds that allows for inductive inferences. This analysis makes 
sense—if a kind is determined by the property similarity of its members, then 
it is this property similarity that enables inductive reasoning about its 
members. Nothing about emergence guarantees the in principle permission of 
inductive inferences. 
 
So it appears that the often cited conditions for natural kindhood have 
no bearing on whether a kind is emergent. They are individually not necessary 
for a kind to be an emergent one. They are also certainly not jointly sufficient 
for emergence. There are easy identifiable examples of this: the kind 
‘hydrogen’ satisfies both NK1 and NK2—it is delineated by the essential non-
relation properties of the possession of one proton and one electron and 
permits inductive inferences to be made about the kind—though it is not 
considered as one that shows emergence. Recalling that since the interest of 
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social scientific realism lies not in showing merely how social scientific kinds 
might exist but how they might exist in an emergent fashion, that these often 
cited natural kindhood conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
emergence is good reason for us to think that whether social scientific kinds 
are natural kinds, though a worthy enquiry, is not an enquiry that we should be 
concerned with here. Whether social scientific kinds are natural kinds has no 
discernible bearing on the truth of social scientific realism. 
But then what does? Remember that our current aim is to figure out 
what ‘kind of kinds’ social scientific kinds are. What ‘kind of kinds’, should it 
be shown that social scientific kinds are of this kind, would have some impact 
on the truth of social scientific realism? 
 
 
4.3 Interactive Kinds 
 
 
Ian Hacking proposes another way of dividing up kinds—one that was 
motivated specifically by the kinds one encounters in the social sciences. To 
borrow Hacking’s term social scientific kinds are interactive kinds—in that 
they interact with things of that kind in “social and material matrices”. These 
are to be contrasted with indifferent kinds that show no such interactivity, i.e. 
they (kinds and individuals of that kind) are indifferent to classification.45 
What exactly though are interactive kinds? Hacking himself is kind enough 
(no pun intended) to supply some instructive examples of such kinds. 
The kind ‘multiple personality disorder (MPD)46 sufferer’ 
interacts with members of that kind, i.e. individual MPD 
sufferers. These sufferers, in response to the MPD 
classification, may come to identify with the kind. These 
                                                             
45 Ian Hacking, The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1999). Quotes from pp. 10 & 11. See also pp. 104-106. 
46 These days termed ‘dissociative identity disorder’. 
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interactions are shaped not just by the responses of the kind 
members but also by the milieu within which such interactions 
take place, in this case the climate within which MPD sufferers 
are treated in a certain socially (and materially) 
acceptable/required way. Perhaps, for example, the increased 
medicalisation of the disorder results in an environment where 
MPD sufferers are viewed sympathetically, prompting more 
individuals to identify themselves as MPD sufferers than 
otherwise would have. This interaction between kind, kind-
member, and kind milieu results in the modification of our 
concept of the kind ‘MPD sufferer’—perhaps ‘MPD sufferer’, 
once thought to be a rare kind, is now thought of as being more 
common.47 
The kinds ‘child abuser’ and ‘abused child’ interacts with 
members of that kind, i.e. the individual child abuser or abused 
child. These reject their classification into their respective 
kind—“[a]bused children and abusive parents describe 
themselves differently and may behave differently (not 
necessarily better) when they come to see themselves as abused 
or abusive”.48  As with MPD sufferers, the way abusers or the 
abused interact with their respective kind-classifications occurs 
against a background—the way others view and treat them. 
Perhaps, for example, the severe treatment of the kind ‘child 
abuser’ causes many child abusers to reject their kind-
classification and change their behaviour. This interaction 
between kind, kind-member, and kind milieu results in the 
modification of our concept of the kind ‘child abuser’—perhaps 
our extension of the kind ‘child abuser’ is changed or perhaps 
the threshold of mistreatment for the kind is lowered such that 
what was once thought to be parental discipline is now thought 
of as child abuse.49 
 
In these examples, it should be noted that not all individual changes 
made by MPD sufferers or child abusers and abused children result in changes 
to their respective kinds—these changes must be enacted by a sizeable number 
of kind members to affect kind change. After all, a sufficient number of MPD 
sufferers have to decide to out themselves as such for the kind MPD sufferer 
to change from being thought of as rare to being thought of as common. 
                                                             
47 Hacking, “Madness: Biological or Constructed?”, The Social Construction of What?, op. 
cit., pp. 100-124.  
48 Ian Hacking, “The Sociology of Knowledge about Child Abuse”, Noûs, Vol. 22, No. 1 
(1988), pp. 53-63. Quote from p. 62. 
49 Hacking, “Kind-Making: The Case of Child Abuse”, The Social Construction of What?, op. 
cit., pp. 125-162. 
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From Hacking’s examples, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, in his discussion 
of interactive kinds, sheds greater light on Hacking’s notion by outlining a five 
stage chain of events that commences with the introduction and labelling of a 
kind.50 
 
(K1) Introduction of the kind k along with the associated k-
label. 
 
(K2) Certain people are classified as being of kind k/of being k-
members and are treated accordingly. 
 
(K3) Some of these people either come to identify with the kind 
k and accept the k-label (whether consciously or not) or reject 
their being classified into kind k and the associated k-label. 
 
(K4) Depending on what they do in K3, these people (or some 
of them) either modify their behaviour to further match what is 
expected of k-members, sometimes acquiring new properties 
not usually expected of k, or modify their behaviours so that 
they no longer fall into the kind k. 
 
(K5) In any case, some of these changes in k-members lead to 
changes in the kind k in that it comes to be associated with a 
new set of properties, leading us to modify our concept of the 





Despite Hacking’s scepticism about being able to provide a general 
account of interactive kinds, Khalidi, from the generalised five-stage chain of 
events articulated above, discerns that interactive kinds are characterised by 
the following two crucial points.51  
(IK1) Interactive kinds involve a two-way interaction between 
classification and the individuals of the kind. This “Looping 
Effect” consequently has two arcs. In the first arc, “we exert 
                                                             
50 Muhammad Ali Khalidi, “Interactive Kinds”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, Vol. 2, No. 61 (2010), pp. 335-360. The five stages are from pp. 337 & 338. Note 
that Khalidi actually has two separate lists of chain of events—one for the kind ‘MPD 
sufferer’ and one for the kind ‘child abuser’. I have condensed both lists into a more generally 
applicable one. 
51 Ibid., p. 338. 
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influence on phenomena and effect some change in them” by 
classifying them into kind k and treating them in a k-
appropriate/required manner (K1 and K2 of the chain of 
events). In the second arc, “those phenomena go on to evolve in 
certain ways in response to that influence, leading us to change 
our conceptions” of kind k (K3 through K5 of the chain of 
events).52 
 
(IK2) Interactive kinds are marked by a transient nature. A 
given interactive kind k may undergo successive iterations (of 
what it is to possess k-ness, how to appropriately treat k-
members, and what is the best way to study k) such that k and 
k-members end up different or differently behaved from what 
they initially were. In short, k is subject to genuine diachronic 
change—the property-cluster that defines k changes over time 
not because of new discoveries of extant things about k but 
because k-members’ responses to classification generates new 
things to discover. Interactive kinds are accordingly “moving 
targets” that pose a challenge to organised study.53 
 
Note that IK1 and IK2 are defining characteristics of interactive kinds—i.e. a 
kind must exhibit them to be considered interactive. An interactive kind must 
be subject to genuine diachronic change and this change must be the work of 
the looping effect displaying both arcs—with kind-classification and kind-
appropriate treatment changing the phenomena and with subsequent changes 
to the kind being the result of such changes in phenomena. 
Khalidi further notes that what Hacking writes may seem to suggest 
two further characteristics of interactive kinds. These, though not the logical 
consequence of stages K1 through K5, are prima facie implied by them. It is 
worth mentioning though that their status as interactive kindhood 
characteristics is dubious.  
(IK3) Interactive kinds are (supposedly) characterised by the 
psychological awareness of their members of their inclusion in 
the kind. On the face of it, the examples that we have been 
working with in elucidating the notion of interactive kinds 
                                                             
52 Ibid., p. 339.  
53 Hacking, The Social Construction of What?, op. cit. p. 108. Khalidi notes this as an 
“epistemological challenge”—something that Hacking disagrees with. See ibid., p. 288; and 
Khalidi, op. cit., p. 342. 
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seems to suggest this. Child abusers only react to their 
classification as such because they are aware of it. The same 
can be said of MPD sufferers. However on further analysis, IK3 
is not characteristic of all interactive kinds—i.e. it is not a 
necessary condition for interactive kindhood. Hacking’s own 
example of MPD sufferers do not require that patients be aware 
either of the classification they have been assigned or that they 
are treated differently for there to be interactivity. The mere 
fact that they are treated differently and respond in certain 
ways to that treatment is enough for looping effects to arise.54 
 
(IK4) Interactive kinds are (supposedly) subjective in that they 
are “merely present in our minds and discourse”. IK4 is really 
motivated by what goes on in the final stage of the chain of 
events that leads to the modification of a particular kind and its 
associated properties (in K5). What new set of properties and 
how our concept of a kind is modified may potentially vary 
depending on who is doing the modifying and it is this 
variability that may lead some to think that interactive kinds are 
not ‘real’ in that they are merely an artefact of our discourse. 
To think this, however, would be to think in error. Yes—certain 
interactive kinds may be mind-dependent in the sense that they 
would not have existed without the thoughts and actions of 
humans, and yes—they and their associated property clusters 
are subject to some variations depending on who considers 
them. But that hardly means that such kinds are not ‘real’. As 
Khalidi himself puts it: “[t]here is a difference between saying 
that a certain kind of individual is present only in the mind of 
the beholder and saying that that kind of individual would not 
have existed without our classifications and has been brought 
about partly in response to them”.55 
 
As we have seen, IK1 and IK2 seem to be the defining hallmarks of interactive 
kindhood while IK3 and IK4 appear dubious—exhibiting them is certainly not 
necessary for a kind to be considered interactive. 
 
4.3.2 Social scientific kinds and interactive kinds 
 
Thus far, Hacking has provided us an alternative way of thinking about 
kinds, suggesting that social scientific kinds are different from their physical 
                                                             
54 Khalidi, op. cit., pp. 347-352. 
55 Ibid., p. 353. 
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science counterparts by way of them being interactive kinds.56 In fact, 
Hacking seems to suggest that only social scientific kinds are interactive 
kinds—something Khalidi has openly rejected, i.e. Khalidi believes interactive 
kinds are inclusive of certain kinds that we normally consider to be kinds in 
the physical sciences. Ironing out this contention is in fact helpful to our 
project. Should it be the case that interactive kinds are social scientific kinds 
(both ‘kind of kinds’ have the same extension), interactivity would then be a 
defining feature of social scientific kinds—a feature that separates social 
scientific kinds from kinds found in the physical sciences. This differentiating 
feature would shed more light on what sets social scientific objects and entities 
apart from garden-variety scientific objects and entities and aid in ascertaining 
the truth of social scientific realism. 
How then does Khalidi argue that interactive kinds are not limited to 
kinds found in the social sciences? He proffers three examples of kinds found 
in the physical sciences that he claims exhibit the same interactivity that 
Hacking is interested in. 
(E1) Carcinoma. Khalidi uses carcinoma as his first example 
and writes that “if some kinds of carcinoma turn out to be 
surgically operable we might come to classify them differently, 
thereby altering the extension of the kind in a significant way”. 
57 
 
(E2) Marijuana. Khalidi points out another example of an 
interactive kind found in the physical sciences, this time 
someone else’s—James Bogen’s example of classifying 
marijuana as illegal. Bogen writes that “[o]ur thinking of these 
plants as crops (as dangerous drugs) produces changes in 
                                                             
56 Hacking never actually uses the phrase ‘social scientific kinds’ but instead designates the 
kinds encountered in the social sciences as ‘human kinds’ or ‘social kinds’. See Hacking, The 
Social Construction of What?, op. cit. 
57 Khalidi, op. cit., p. 343. 
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cultivation, distribution, etc. These changes affect the plants, 
and attention to those effects changes our ideas.”58 
 
(E3) Food. Finally, Khalidi extends Sally Haslanger’s example 
as another case in point. He writes that “in the case of animals 
classified as food, our human classificatory practices have led 
over generations to the selective breeding of certain organisms, 
giving rise to new species and subspecies. These species have, 
in turn, altered the extension of our concept of food, since some 
plant varieties not considered food have been genetically 
altered through selective breeding to be edible. It has also led to 
the emergence of new concepts, such as livestock and 
poultry.”59  
 
On the face of it, all three appear to be legitimate examples of kinds 
found in the physical sciences that exhibit the same interactivity as do social 
scientific kinds such as ‘MPD sufferer’ and ‘child abuser’. Upon closer 
inspection, however, something seems amiss in each case. 
To begin with, Khalidi’s own example of carcinoma does not seem to 
actually satisfy the looping effect as fleshed out in IK1: there is no ‘first 
arc’—that some carcinoma are surgically operable is an extant property of 
some elements of the kind-set and not a newly generated property. It is not 
that some of these carcinoma acquired ‘surgical operability’ as a new property 
because of human interactions with them as the satisfaction of IK1 would 
require. Physicians discovered something about the phenomena as opposed to 
effecting some change through classification or kind-appropriate treatment. 
                                                             
58 Ibid. See also James Bogen, “Comments on ‘The Sociology of Knowledge about Child 
Abuse’ ”, Noûs, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1988), pp. 65 & 66. Quote from p. 66. 
59 Khalidi, op. cit., p. 345. 
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Khalidi’s second and third examples fare no better. There are two 
issues that plague both examples.60 The first more obvious issue is that it is 
controversial whether the kinds the examples concern themselves with are 
truly kinds found in the physical sciences and not in the social sciences. Using 
the marijuana example as a case in point, the classification ‘substances that are 
illegal’ seems far more like something the social sciences rather than the 
physical sciences are concerned with, casting doubt on whether the kind 
‘marijuana’ Khalidi speaks of is really the one found in the physical sciences. 
‘Food’ might perhaps be less controversially a kind from the physical 
sciences, but only if it is unpacked to mean something along the lines of 
“substances that when ingested do not result in serious physiological harm or 
fatality” and not the more likely “substances that are sufficiently appetizing to 
be considered consumable”. Nevertheless the point is that if these kinds are 
not, in fact, natural kinds, then Khalidi’s examples hardly establish the claim 
that interactive kinds are not limited merely to social scientific kinds. 
The second issue is more subtle and, if genuinely a problem, far more 
pernicious to the claim Khalidi seeks to establish. It is unclear as to what 
extent his examples exhibit the second arc of Hacking’s looping effect. 
Assume that altering what we think of marijuana (i.e. including in the 
property-cluster that corresponds to the term a new property, namely 
illegality) does in fact affect the phenomena concerned and marijuana goes 
                                                             
60 Hacking actually has his own response to Khalidi’s second and third examples though they 
are not very convincing. He thinks that these examples do not show that certain kinds found in 
the physical sciences can be interactive kinds as, in these cases, it is not the act of 
classification itself that changes the phenomena. (Hacking 1986, p. 166). Yet as, Khalidi 
rightly points out, the first arc of interactivity crucial to the looping effect exhibited by such 
interactive kinds can be brought about not just by the act of classifying a phenomena as of a 
kind but by treating such phenomena in kind-appropriate ways. See Ian Hacking, “Making up 
People”, in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western 
Thought, edited by T. C. Heller and C. Brooke-Rose (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 
1986),  pp. 22 – 36; and Khalidi, op. cit., p. 344. 
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from being abundantly grown to scarcely found. Does this newfound dearth of 
marijuana lead us to revise our conceptions of the kind ‘marijuana’? Yes and 
no. On one hand, no because nothing about ‘marijuana’ as botanical or 
chemical kind has changed—it remains a substance derivative of Cannabis 
sativa with psychotropic properties. On the other hand, in a world where 
Cannabis sativa and its derivatives are scarce, people may interact with it in 
ways that they would not have were it abundant: they may actively search for 
it, hoard it, et cetera—‘marijuana’ as social scientific kind has changed. And 
herein lies the problem: Khalidi wishes to establish that interactive kinds are 
not limited to social scientific kinds by pointing out that ‘marijuana’, as 
botanical-chemical kind, satisfies Hacking’s looping effect criterion, namely 
that it exhibits genuine change resulting from the alterations in phenomena 
brought about by our classificatory efforts. Yet this kind shows no such 
change. To insist that it does is to view ‘marijuana’, not as botanical-chemical 
kind as Khalidi intended, but as social scientific kind. Consequently, either 
‘marijuana’ as botanical-chemical kind remains the same and is not an 
interactive kind or it is an interactive kind but is also a social scientific kind. In 
any case, ‘marijuana’ is not the botanical-chemical interactive kind that 
Khalidi makes it out to be. The same point can be made with the kind ‘food’. 
The inclusion of new elements into the kind-set food due to our genetic 
tampering of plants and animals changes nothing about ‘food’ as a kind found 
in the physical sciences—it remains the class of substances that are not 
harmful and provide adequate nutrition when ingested—but may change 
‘food’ as social scientific kind—gastronomical appetites may shift as may the 
human relationship with eating and sustenance. Again ‘food’ as a kind is 
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either from the physical sciences but unchanged or altered but a social 
scientific one. Khalidi may have a response to this at least with respect to the 
‘food’ example. It might be pointed out that though ‘food’ as kind found in the 
physical sciences may not interact with phenomena such that changes in them 
brought about by classification/kind-identification in turn changes the kind 
itself, it does give rise to new kinds like ‘livestock’ and ‘poultry’. Surely this 
counts as some form of interactivity, or so it might be argued. Admittedly, the 
classification or identification of certain kinds found in the physical sciences 
may result in the emergence of new kinds, whether also found in the physical 
sciences or otherwise. Yet this is hardly the sort of interactivity Hacking 
appears interested in—‘food’ itself as a kind found in the physical sciences, 
despite its role in generating or identifying new kinds, remains unaltered. The 
generation or identification of new kinds strictly does not itself translate to 
their parent kind being interactive. 
Consequently we see that Khalidi’s examples do nothing to scotch the 
view that Hacking proposes: interactivity of the sort identified by Hacking 
does indeed appear limited to social scientific kinds and as such appear to be a 
defining feature of such kinds. This information will prove useful in our 
attempt to ascertain the truth of social scientific realism. 
 
 
4.4 A Reason to Endorse Social Scientific Realism 
 
 
We finally have all the pieces of the puzzle. We know that social 
scientific realism is committed to the objects of social scientific inquiry having 
an emergent existence, that the autonomy that such an emergent existence 
calls for is characterised by ontological supervenience, and that the best way 
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to understand such social scientific objects are to think of them as kinds which 
show interactivity. How does this all fit together? I propose that the interactive 
nature of social scientific objects gives us a reason to endorse social scientific 
realism, i.e. endorse that such objects have an ontological supervenient 
emergent existence. The argument for this is quite a handful so it might be 
prudent to break up the premises into manageable portions. 
Here is how the argument would begin. 
(1) Social scientific realism is the thesis that social scientific 
objects—the objects of social scientific inquiry—have 
an emergent existence as set out by the account of 
emergence known as General Ontological 
Supervenience Emergence. (Definition) 
(2) Showing that social scientific objects meet the 
conditions set out for General Ontological 
Supervenience Emergence would give us a reason to 
think social scientific realism true. (1, simple point of 
reasoning) 
 
The argument starts by drawing on the definition of social scientific realism 
that we derived in II and III and outlines in 2 how it aims to go about 
providing a reason for endorsing the view—by showing that its defining 
commitment of social scientific objects being ontologically superveniently 
emergent is correct. 
(3) Showing both that social scientific objects are 
supervenient on physical phenomena and that it is not 
the case that there cannot be a difference in physical 
phenomena without a corresponding difference in the 
related social scientific objects would give us a reason to 
think social scientific realism true. (2, simple point of 
reasoning) 
 
3 merely breaks down the conditions specified in the general ontological 
supervenience account of emergence. 
(4) Supervenience is a relation such that A supervenes on B 
if (and only if) there cannot be a difference in A without 
there being a corresponding difference in B. (Definition) 
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(5) So social scientific objects supervene on physical 
phenomena if (and only if) there cannot be a difference 
in social scientific objects without a corresponding 
difference in physical phenomena. (4) 
 
In 4, the definition of supervenience is rehearsed. This definition is used in 5 
to articulate the (necessary and) sufficient condition to be met for social 
scientific objects to be supervenient on physical phenomena. 
(6) Social scientific objects are social scientific kinds. 
(Proven assumption) 
 
6 recalls that the objects of social scientific inquiry (what social scientists are 
interested in) are social scientific kinds and not particular isolated instances of 
social scientific phenomena. 
(7) Social scientific kinds are interactive kinds. (Proven 
assumption) 
 
Here, the conclusion we derived in the previous section (after countering 
Khalidi’s claims) is reiterated—social scientific kinds share the same 
extension as interactive kinds and hence are interactive kinds. 
(8) A kind is considered an interactive kind only if it 
exhibits the two-way interaction (or looping effect) 
between the classification and treatment of the kind and 
particular instances of its phenomena—i.e. the 
classification of phenomena into a kind and treating 
them in kind-appropriate ways changes the phenomena 
itself (first arc) with subsequent changes to the kind and 
our understanding of it being the result of such changes 
in phenomena (second arc). (Definition) 
(9) So a kind is considered an interactive kind only if it 
exhibits both arcs of the looping effect. (8) 
(10) A kind is considered an interactive kind only if it 
exhibits the second arc of the looping effect. (9) 
(11) A kind is considered an interactive kind only if changes 
to the kind and our understanding of it are the result of 
changes in phenomena of that kind. (8 & 10) 
 
A few things are happening here. 8 restates one of the defining characteristics 
of interactive kinds—the looping effect—while 9 reformulates this as a 
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necessary condition for interactive kindhood. Furthermore, since the looping 
effect has two arcs, both of which are crucial, it is inferred in 10 that 
exhibiting the second arc of the looping effect is on its own a necessary 
condition for a kind to be considered an interactive one. 11 recapitulates what 
this second loop involves. 
(12) A kind is considered an interactive kind only if there 
cannot be a difference in the kind without there being a 
corresponding difference in phenomena of that kind. 
(11) 
 
12 is merely the logical entailment of 11. If it must be the case that changes to 
a kind are the result of changes in phenomena of that kind, then it must also be 
the case that there cannot be a difference in that kind without there being a 
corresponding difference in phenomena of that kind. 
(13) Social scientific kinds satisfy any and all necessary 
conditions for a kind to be considered an interactive 
kind. (7, simple point of reasoning) 
(14) So social scientific kinds are such that there cannot be a 
difference in kind without there being a corresponding 
difference in phenomena of that kind. (12 & 13) 
 
These steps are simple. In 13, social scientific kinds satisfy any and all 
necessary conditions for a kind to be considered an interactive kind simply 
because we have already established (in 7) that they are interactive kinds. 
Since this is so, the necessary condition for interactive kindhood outlined in 12 
is satisfied and, as stated in 14, this condition, having been met, must be a 
characteristic of social scientific kinds—namely that there cannot be a 
difference in kind without there being a corresponding difference in 
phenomena of that kind. 
(15) So social scientific objects are such that there cannot be 
a difference in social scientific objects without there 
being a corresponding difference in phenomena of that 




15 is merely the result of remembering in 6 that the objects of social scientific 
inquiry are kinds and hence that the terms ‘social scientific kind’ and ‘social 
scientific object’ can be used interchangeably. 
(16) Any difference in social scientific phenomena must 
correspond to a difference in physical phenomena. 
(Proven assumption) 
 
This premise might seem prima facie just plain incorrect at first though really 
it is not. Here, recalling that social scientific phenomena are in some sense 
reducible to physical phenomena is helpful. Reusing an example in III, it is 
hard to deny that the state of the economy is in some sense reducible to the 
physical movements and activities of individual homo sapiens. Should these 
be any different, so too would the state of the economy. Because of this, any 
change in social scientific phenomena would be accompanied by a change in 
physical phenomena.  
(17) So social scientific objects are such that there cannot be 
a difference in social scientific objects without there 
being a corresponding difference in physical 
phenomena. (15 & 16) 
 
17 comes from 15, 16, and the use of transitivity—social scientific objects are 
such that there cannot be a difference in social scientific objects without there 
being a corresponding difference in phenomena of that kind (social scientific 
phenomena) which in turn cannot be different without physical phenomena 
being different. So social scientific objects are such that there cannot be a 
difference in social scientific objects without there being a corresponding 
difference in physical phenomena. 
(18) Social scientific objects satisfy the sufficient condition 
for it to be considered supervenient on physical 
phenomena. (5 & 17) 
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(19) Social scientific objects are supervenient on physical 
phenomena. (18) 
 
These two steps are easy to follow. Social scientific objects, being such that 
there cannot be a difference in social scientific objects without there being a 
corresponding difference in physical phenomena, meets the condition set out 
earlier (in 5) for it to be the case that they supervene on physical phenomena 
(18). Social scientific objects are thus supervenient (19). So we have thus far 
established that social scientific objects meet one of the conditions for General 
Ontological Supervenience Emergence. On to the next condition—that it is not 
the case that there cannot be a difference in physical phenomena without a 
corresponding difference in the related social scientific objects 
(20) It is not the case for interactive kinds that all changes to 
individual phenomena of such a kind leads to changes of 
that kind. (Proven assumption) 
 
20 comes from our earlier discussion on interactive kinds. As mentioned at the 
very start of that discussion, changes to individual phenomena must be enacted 
by a sizeable number of kind members to affect kind change. Not all changes 
to individual phenomena affects the kind. 
(21) It is not the case for social scientific objects that all 
changes to related physical phenomena lead to changes 
of those objects. (20) 
(22) It is not the case that there cannot be a difference in 
physical phenomena without a corresponding difference 
in the related social scientific objects. (21) 
 
 
Here the former premise, 21, is the result of remembering once again that 
interactive kinds are social scientific kinds which in turn are social scientific 
objects (the objects of social scientific inquiry) and that changes to social 
scientific phenomena cannot occur without changes to physical phenomena. 
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The latter, 22, is merely the logical entailment of 21 and the second condition 
of General Ontological Supervenience Emergence. 
(23) Social scientific objects meet the conditions set out for 
General Ontological Supervenience Emergence. (3, 19, 
& 22) 
(24) We have a reason to think social scientific realism is 
true. (2 & 23) 
 
The remainder of the argument is easy to follow. In 23, we reiterate that social 
scientific objects meet both conditions set out for General Ontological 
Supervenience Emergence. Recalling that showing this would give us a reason 
to think social scientific realism true (in 2), we hence have a reason to think 
social scientific realism true (24). 
 It should be noted that though this argument seems focused on the 
metaphysical aspect of social scientific realism—mainly the metaphysical 
thesis that social scientific objects have an emergent existence—its force is not 
merely limited to that. To provide a reason to think the metaphysical thesis of 
social scientific realism true is to also provide one for thinking its semantic 
and epistemic theses true; if the world of social scientific inquiry has a 
emergent existence, then theoretical descriptions in the social sciences should 
be taken literally (and not dismissed as short-hand claims about physical 
phenomena) and can be justifiably thought of as being approximately true of 






In this final substantive chapter, we have taken a significant step 
towards ascertaining the truth of social scientific realism. We have seen that 
the best way to understand the objects of social scientific inquiry is as social 
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scientific kinds. Whether these kinds are natural kinds is irrelevant to the truth 
of social scientific realism—what is pertinent is that social scientific kinds 
(and only social scientific kinds contrary to what Khalidi claims) are 
interactive kinds. This interactivity turns out to be crucial—it allowed us to 
provide an argument that provides a reason for thinking social scientific 
realism true. Social scientific objects do appear to exist in the sense of having 








I began by spelling out the realism that philosophers of science are so 
familiar with: scientific realism—the position that the structures and entities 
that the physical sciences purport to exist accurately portray a mind-
independent reality. This went some way in aiding in our understanding of 
social scientific realism. Though rudimentary definitions of social scientific 
realism threatened to trivialise the view, it was successfully outlined along 
with its themes of convergence, mind-dependence, objectivity, and, most 
crucially, emergence, showing how different realist commitments in the social 
sciences are from those in the physical sciences. In fact, we have seen that 
there are greater concerns—the direct unobservability of social phenomena 
and the increased worry of underdetermination—that surround the issue of 
social scientific realism than the issue of scientific realism. 
 With social scientific realism resting very much on the notion of 
emergence, we undertook an exploration of the notion, eventually identifying, 
by using the central questions of emergence, the account that best gelled with 
the view. This account—General Ontological Supervenience Emergence—
proved consistent with social scientific realism’s defining themes and is 
plausible—despite what detractors, with their accusations of 
epiphenomenalism, might think. Remarkably, endorsing it only strengthens 
the credibility of social scientific realism—the inescapable notion of social 
scientific objects being in some sense reducible to physical phenomena is 
preserved while allowing for such objects to be emergent. 
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Having finally reached a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of 
social scientific realism as a view, we turned to social scientific objects 
themselves, discovering that what is of interest in the study of social scientific 
phenomena is the study of such phenomena as kinds. These social scientific 
kinds, though their natural kind status remaining a mystery, emphatically are 
interactive kinds. This interactivity, together with the knowledge that social 
scientific realism is committed to social scientific objects possessing an 
emergent existence that supervenes on physical phenomena, yielded a lengthy 
argument offering, to my mind, a persuasive reason to think social scientific 
realism true. 
It is hoped that this thesis goes some way in overturning the 
assumption that realist commitments in the physical sciences and those in the 
social sciences are exactly the same. As mentioned before, social scientific 
realism warrants more (if not at least the same) philosophical discussion as its 
counterpart in the physical sciences and this thesis provides a strong starting 








Bedau, Mark & Paul Humphreys (editors). Emergence: Contemporary 
Readings in Philosophy and Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008). 
Berrios, G.E. “Classifications in psychiatry: a conceptual history”, Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 1999), pp. 145-
160. 
 
Bogen, James. “Comments on ‘The Sociology of Knowledge about Child 
Abuse’ ”, Noûs, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1988), pp. 65 & 66 
 
Cahill, Spencer E. “Toward a Sociology of the Person”, Sociological Theory, 
Vol. 16, No.2 (July 1997), pp. 131-148. 
 
Campbell, Joseph, Michael O’Rourke, & Matthew Slater, Carving Nature at 
Its Joints: Natural Kinds in Metaphysics and Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2011). 
 
Cleeve, James Van. “Mind—Dust or Magic? Panpsychism versus 
Emergence”, Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 4 (1990), pp. 215-226. 
 
Cox, John D.  to m  atche s  the tu bu ent histo y o  weathe  p ediction 
  om   ank in’s kite to     i o (New Jersey: John Wiley, 2002). 
 
Fodor, Jerry. “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis)”, Synthese, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1974), reprinted in Emergence: 
Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science, edited by Mark Bedau & 
Paul Humphreys (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 395-409. 
 
Goodman, Nelson. Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978). 
 
Goodman, Nelson. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
4th edition (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983, originally published 1955). 
 
Hacking, Ian. The Social Construction of What? (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
 
Hacking, Ian. “The Sociology of Knowledge about Child Abuse”, Noûs, Vol. 
22, No. 1 (1988), pp. 53-63. 
 
Humphreys, Paul. “How Properties Emerge”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, 
No. 1 (1997), pp. 1-17, reprinted in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in 
Philosophy and Science, edited by Mark Bedau & Paul Humphreys 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 111-126. 
 
Khalidi, Muhammad Ali. “Interactive Kinds”, The British Journal for the 




Kim, Jaegwon. “Making Sense of Emergence”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 
95, No. 1 (1999), reprinted in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in 
Philosophy and Science, edited by Mark Bedau & Paul Humphreys 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2008), pp. 127-153. 
 
Kukla, André. Social Construction and the Philosophy of Science (London: 
Routledge, 2000). 
 
Leplin, Jarett. “Realism and Novelty”, A Novel Defence of Scientific Realism 
(New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 98-135. 
  
Maxwell, Grover. “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities”, Minnesota 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 3 (1962), pp. 3-15. 
 
McLaughlin, Brian. “Emergence and Supervenience”, Intellectica, Vol. 25 
(1997), reprinted in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and 
Science, edited by Mark Bedau & Paul Humphreys (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2008), pp. 81-97. 
 
Mill, J. S. A System of Logic Vol. II (London: Longman, 1884), pp. 212-234. 
 
Murray, Robin. The Essentials of Postgraduate Psychiatry (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 
O’Connor, Timothy. “Emergent Properties”, American Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1994), pp. 91-104. 
 
O’Connor, Timothy & Hong Yu Wong. “The Metaphysics of Emergence”, 
Noûs, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2005), pp. 658-678. 
 
Psillos, Stathis. Scientific Realism: How science tracks truth (London: 
Routledge, 1999). 
 
Quine, W. V. Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1969). 
 
Rorty, Richard. Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991). 
 
van Fraassen, Bas. The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), pp. 13-19. 
 
Wimsatt, William C. “Aggregativitiy: Reductive Heuristics for Finding 
Emergence”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, No. 2, Supplement 2 (1997), 
reprinted in Emergence: Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science, 





Wong, Hong Yu. “The Secret Lives of Emergents”, Emergence in Science and 
Philosophy, edited by Antonella Corradini & Timothy O’Connor (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), pp. 7-24. 
